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ABSTRACT
Water Use and Natural Limits in the Las Vegas Valley: A History of the Southern
Nevada Water Authority
By
Christian S. Harrison
Dr. David Wrobel, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis examines the history of the Southern Nevada Water Authority
(SNWA) and how it has helped transform various aspects of southern Nevada’s economy
and environment. Prior to the establishment of the SNWA in 1991 the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Area (LVMA) possessed several competing water providers whose
opposition to one another adversely affected the management of water in the region.
These water providers recognized this problem, came together, and negotiated the
creation of a regional water agency, the SNWA. This organization, comprised of
representatives from each of the LVMA’s water providers has the power to institute
policy across municipal boundaries. The SNWA has proven to be a remarkably potent
political organization, one whose success has generated significant controversy. This
study speaks to these local historical developments, while contextualizing the SNWA and
water use in Southern Nevada within a larger historical context of water use in the
southwestern United States and, more broadly, in desert environments worldwide.
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CHAPTER 1

DEXCEPTIONALIZING THE DEMON
The history of early Las Vegas reads like that of countless other western American
towns. Las Vegas, or rather, the group of cities, unincorporated townships, and masterplanned communities that comprise the Las Vegas Metropolitan Area (LVMA), has an
international reputation for glamour and exoticism that belies the fact that this modern
metropolis is solidly grounded within the larger historical context of the American West.1
The sequence of human settlement from Indian to European is a common theme
throughout the region—a trait shared by almost every urban settlement in the West—as
are the economic drivers of ranching, mining, and railroading. Like scores of other
western settlements, local geography provided some characteristics that favored human
habitation. In the Las Vegas Valley it was the abundance of springs and aquifers that
provided a year round supply of water.
It is important to realize that there are dozens of major cities throughout the world
located in extremely harsh desert regions. Examples include Mecca, Baghdad, Cairo,
Jeddah, Johannesburg, and Tripoli. The size of these cities stands, ostensibly at least, in
stark contrast to their surroundings; Cairo, Egypt has a population of over 10 million
people, a figure comparable to present day Los Angeles County; Baghdad, Iraq (prior to
the current war and accompanying exodus of refugees): 3.4 million; Alexandria, Egypt:
1

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Area is comprised of the cities of Henderson, Las Vegas, and North Las
Vegas, as well as the unincorporated communities of Winchester, Paradise, Enterprise, and Spring Valley.
Some representations also include the neighboring communities of Boulder City and Blue Diamond.
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2.9 million; and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 1.2 million. Countless elementary students
throughout the country are taught that western civilization, for better or worse, began in
Mesopotamia, a desert land also known as the Fertile Crescent. Grade-schoolers are also
able to describe the ancient wonders of Egypt, and know through pictures of the pyramids
that it is a desert civilization. Furthermore, of the world’s five largest religions, three
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) began in the desert. It is hard to overstate the cultural
influence of these religions and their effect on world history. The environmental theme
that ties all of these settlements together, and makes their subsequent cultural
development possible, is their proximity to a year-round water source.2
Like their global counterparts, almost all western American desert cities adhere to
similar geographic principles. They are found near sources of water, which can appear at
the base of mountains (Reno, Salt Lake City), along rivers (El Paso, Albuquerque), and
overlying aquifers or springs (Palm Springs, Tucson). American desert cities also
possess significant populations; the Phoenix metropolitan area has almost four million
residents, and Tucson has almost one million; El Paso, Texas: two million; and
Albuquerque, New Mexico over 700,000.3 Las Vegas currently has all three of these
environmental conditions (proximity to mountains, river, and springs), and it, too, has a
large population. Deserts throughout history often possessed resources of one kind or
another that have spurred economic demand. The ancient cities of North Africa and the
Middle East were strategically located along trade routes or in agricultural regions, such
as the Nile River Valley. These entrepôts attracted capital and often substantial
populations. In the twentieth-century, cities in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, to name a few,

2
3

Michael A Mares, Encyclopedia of Deserts (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 118-119.
United States Census Bureau, available from www.usgs.gov.
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grew as a result of the world’s demand for oil. In Las Vegas's case, the city's decadeslong monopoly on gambling produced profound levels of growth, a development
indicative of the shifting political geography of the West that determined the gambling
industry’s legality on one side of an invisible state boundary-line but not the other.
Presently there are approximately two million people living in the Las Vegas
metropolitan area. But while this broader global and national desert heritage is clearly
evident, one would never know it from reading contemporary critiques of LVMA water
use. Las Vegas, or the metropolitan area people perceive as Las Vegas, has long been the
object of literary scorn. Early criticism focused on the city’s moral depredation, a result
of legalized gambling, prostitution, and easy divorce. Increasingly, criticism is aimed at
Las Vegas’ supposedly cavalier attitude toward the environment. Many recent books and
articles reveal a deep bias against the place. Two examples are Lasso the Wind, by
Timothy Egan, and Dead Cities, by Mike Davis. Each book’s premise is that no one
should live in Las Vegas, that the environment here is too harsh for human habitation.
Each book delivers a scathing critique of Las Vegas, its citizens, and local values
governing water use. Interestingly though, each author based his conclusions on selective
data that precluded an accurate assessment of the place. Revealingly, neither author lives
in southern Nevada, and each based his work on a short visit to town. Their biased
treatment of Las Vegas reveals a preconceived notion of the place that stands in stark
contrast to southern Nevada’s environmental reality. Given their bias, it is doubtful
whether Egan, a resident of the Pacific Northwest, and Davis, a resident of Southern
California, really needed to visit Las Vegas at all.4

4

Timothy Egan, Lasso The Wind: Away to the New West (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998); Mike Davis,
Dead Cities (New York: New Press, 2002).
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Despite the fact that environmental history took a “cultural turn” in the 1990s, a
historiographic direction that gave as much attention to how people have conceptualized
nature as to nature itself, many authors continue to take a declensionist tack when writing
about Las Vegas. “Declensionism” refers to a state of moral decline, and writers who
adopt this trope see only the negative side of human actions. Works of this genre view
Las Vegas as a veritable Sodom and Gomorrah rolled into one, and predict the city’s (Las
Vegas’s) imminent demise, portending the moment when the misplaced metropolis
finally steps past environmental limitations and begins the downward spiral toward
oblivion. Unfortunately, neither Egan nor Davis extends the discussion on water issues
in the Las Vegas Valley and the larger American Southwest. They merely echo the
negativity of numerous earlier works that emphasized the seamier side of Las Vegas. To
be sure, modern Las Vegas has a significant impact on the local environment, and this
study is not an advocation for unrestricted growth; but argues instead that Las Vegas be
placed alongside other regional centers and judged on similar terms. The southwestern
United States has a long history of human habitation and is facing the challenges of
increased population and an overtaxed water supply. However, preaching doom and
gloom to shock readers does little to further solutions to these pressing issues, nor do
these accounts present an accurate description of the region or its people.
During the nineteenth century, the themes of small urban population and successive
waves of settlement and displacement defined the history of most cities throughout the
American West. (Notable exceptions were Los Angeles and San Francisco whose
meteoric rises in population were without precedent). At the time of Las Vegas’ creation
Reno, Carson City and Virginia City were the only notable towns in Nevada. Las Vegas’
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development followed normal growth patterns in the West until roughly the time that the
Hoover Dam was built. At that point southern Nevada received enormous federal
funding, which allowed it to explore atypical economic ventures, most notably gaming,
which then set it apart from its regional neighbors; but even this, had its roots in western
cultural history. Gambling existed in almost every western town during the nineteenth
century; especially the rough and tumble mining camps that helped jumpstart the region.
As cities became “respectable,” however, gaming became less prevalent, so much so that
when Nevada re-legalized the activity in 1931 mainstream America viewed it as a rogue
industry.
Up until the signing of the Colorado River Compact in 1922, Las Vegas’ history
resembled that of most western American towns. The deviations did not occur until after
the signing of the Compact and the construction of Hoover Dam, at which point a new
economic resource was available for exploitation. As the waters of Lake Mead rose
behind the dam, so too did the level of government expenditure in southern Nevada. The
government wages that dam workers earned found their way into local banks and
businesses, and myriad housing developments, as well as the government town of
Boulder City, which sprouted from the desert and helped ignite the local economy. This
initial federal project led to others: the creation of the United States Army Aerial
Gunnery Range (later renamed Nellis Air Force Base) in 1941, and the Nevada Test Site
in 1950, where the Department of Energy tested nuclear weapons until the 1992
worldwide moratorium. Basic Magnesium, Incorporated (BMI) was an important
defense contractor that built its processing plant in 1940-41 in what later became
Henderson. These projects helped create what had long eluded southern Nevada—

5

economic stability.5 It was then that urban economic and geographic expansion became
feasible in the minds of southern Nevadans. For better or worse, the Hoover Dam
drastically changed the face of the Las Vegas Valley.
As the LVMA’s urban population gradually expanded it consumed larger amounts of
water, but unlike other cities in the region Las Vegas has run up against its legal
allotment. This development, perhaps unfairly conveys the message that Las Vegas
cannot live within its means. This perception is based on a faulty premise, since it fails to
account for Nevada’s comparatively small allocation under the Compact. Other cities in
the region use greater amounts of water, but have remained within their more generous
allotments. This is not to say that urban development and growth in the Las Vegas
Valley has not had an enormous environmental impact. The metropolis has displaced
numerous species of plants and animals and can be wasteful with some of its resources.
But this is something that is common to all urban areas, not just Las Vegas. Despite the
city’s reputation for waste, it has actually taken significant steps to reduce its water
consumption since 1991.
The use of artesian water and recycled water has gone a long way toward meeting the
valley’s water needs. However, given the unrelenting growth, urban planners are now
considering options such as water importation via pipeline from northeastern Nevada and
purchasing agricultural water rights. This action has gained wide public attention, but is a
trend that has several precedents throughout the American West. Other cities in the
region employ water delivery systems far larger than that proposed between Las Vegas
and northern Nevada. For example, the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) currently pipes
millions of acre-feet of Colorado River Water through a tunnel thirteen miles in length
5

Eugene Moehring, Resort City in the Sunbelt (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 13-40.
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that goes underneath Rocky Mountain National Park, taking water from the western
slope and sending it to the city of Denver.6 Los Angeles and Phoenix both receive
Colorado River water via 250-mile long aqueducts. And this type of water engineering is
not unique to the American West. Boston, New York, and Atlanta have constructed
extensive pipelines siphoning water to their urban areas from distant sources, often
several hundred miles away. To single Las Vegas out for following a common course is
illogical and ignores the inequitable nature of the Compact.
Contrary to alarmist pronouncements from the criers of doom, the metropolitan area is
not on the edge of environmental catastrophe, and is in fact coming up with some
interesting and progressive ways of addressing its water shortage. Not least of which is
the creation of the Southern Nevada Water Authority in 1991, a regionally focused water
provider whose main mission is to provide water to the LVMA, and has implemented a
comprehensive water management plan that has greatly reduced water consumption rates
from prior levels.
If the Colorado River Compact were rewritten today there would be little chance that a
metropolis like Las Vegas would receive such a small allotment. In 1922, California had
far more political power and population than any other state in the West and was in the
position to heavily influence the manner in which the Colorado River resource was
distributed. California’s political leaders’ sole interest was to solidify their state’s future
growth. They accomplished this task, but did so at the expense of other Colorado River
Basin states, especially Nevada. The Colorado River Compact is based on an early
twentieth century reality, a time when Los Angeles was the only western city with over 1

6

United States Bureau of Reclamation. Colorado-Big Thompson Project. Available from
http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/cbt.html#general
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million residents. The population of the American West has grown enormously since
1922, but the water allotments have remained the same. The following figures reflect the
2006 population estimate for the Colorado River basin states: Arizona currently has 6.2
million residents; California—36.5 million; Colorado—4.75 million; Nevada—2.5
million; New Mexico—2 million; Utah—2.5 million; and Wyoming—515,000.7 Clearly,
the situation has changed drastically with respect to population, yet the Colorado River
Compact continues to reflect a 1920s reality and is proving inadequate in dealing with the
social and environmental pressures of the twenty-first century.
Given the modern day image of Las Vegas as a leading world destination, and the
media attention to its current water shortage and spectacular growth rates, it is easy to
forget that the city began just like many others across the American West. Las Vegas and
Southern Nevada witnessed a similar sequence of historical characters as that seen in
places throughout the region: first the Indians, then mountain men, followed by federal
explorers, Mormons, ranchers, and two railroads. Water in southern Nevada supported
limited agriculture as it did in places such as Phoenix, Denver, and Boise. And the
railroad chose the Las Vegas Valley as a way station, because of its water supply, placing
it alongside other railroad towns such as Cheyenne and Laramie, Wyoming, and Reno
and Battle Mountain, Nevada. There is simply nothing exceptional about Las Vegas and
its use of water prior to the creation of the SNWA in 1991. After that point, however, it is
exceptional, but not for the reasons so often cited by visiting writers. Rather, the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Area has created a singular entity that incorporates the needs of each
of southern Nevada’s communities. As a result water has been utilized with a greater
degree of efficiency throughout the region, and formerly competing water purveyors have
7

United States Census Bureau, 2006 population estimate, available from www.census.gov.
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come together to create a politically powerful organization capable of affecting water
policy throughout the Colorado River Basin.

9

CHAPTER 2

LAS VEGAS AND THE AMERICAN WEST
While modern Las Vegas appears to sprout as if from nowhere, its existence is
actually deeply rooted in the local geography. A well-known historian once proclaimed
that Las Vegas “owes nothing to its surroundings.”8 This is a difficult statement to
maintain when faced with the fact that for over nine millennia humans have called the
Las Vegas Valley home, a trend only possible because the region contains the necessary
preconditions to attract and sustain human life.9 On the surface the Las Vegas Valley
appears harsh and forbidding, but a closer examination reveals an area of surprising
biodiversity, something made possible by the numerous water sources located throughout
the valley.
Las Vegas is located within the Basin and Range province, which extends east from
the Sierra Nevada to the Wasatch Front and south into Mexico. It is largely defined by
interior drainage, with the notable exception of the Colorado River. The Sonora Desert of
Arizona and Northern Mexico and the Great Basin Desert of Nevada and Utah intersect
and create the Mojave Desert. The Mojave averages ten inches of precipitation
annually—for the Las Vegas Valley, the rainfall is even lower at four inches. This
precipitation is split evenly between summer and winter, making the Mojave the hottest

8

Hal Rothman, Neon Metropolis: How Las Vegas Started the Twenty-First Century. (London: Routledge,
2002), xi.
9
Elizabeth Von Til Warren, The Las Vegas Springs: A Disappeared Resource. (Doctoral Dissertation,
Washington State University, 2001).
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desert in America with the record temperature set in 1913 in Death Valley at 134°
Fahrenheit.10. Although harsh, biodiversity abounds in the Mojave, including the
creosote bush, a plant that constantly replicates itself through cloning, with some
specimens as old as 11,000 years.11 This is the physical setting of which Las Vegas is a
part.
The desert interior is the result of a rain shadow caused by the Sierra Nevada, a range
of mountains over four hundred miles in length that stretches from just south of Mt.
Lassen in northern California to Tehachapi Pass north of Los Angeles. Many of its peaks
reach over 14,000 feet in elevation and block moisture from reaching further eastward.
As moisture-laden air from the Pacific Ocean moves up and over the mountain range, the
temperature decreases, a principle known as orographic lift. As the temperature goes
down, the air loses its ability to retain moisture and deposits most of it in the form of
snow on the western slope of the Sierra. This de-humidified air then travels over Death
Valley and the Panamint mountain range and finally to the Spring Mountains, which form
the western border of the Las Vegas Valley. These mountains rise to an elevation of
11,912 feet, two full miles above the Las Vegas Valley floor and further compound the
rain shadow effect. Even though they tend to block snow and rain from falling directly
on the Las Vegas Valley, precipitation still percolates down into underlying aquifers.
This water erupts in three main springs along the bluff west of present day downtown Las
Vegas and has nourished a wide range of plant and animal life since prehistoric times.
Along with these main springs there exist several more scattered throughout the Valley in

10

United States Geologic Survey, Geology of Death Valley. Available from
http://wrgis.wr.usgs.gov/parks/deva/weather.html; http://www.nps.gov/deva/naturescience/weather-andclimate.htm.
11
http://www.nps.gov/jotr/naturescience/creosote.htm.
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at least five other areas.12 The frequency and reliability of the springs illustrates a
location that favors human habitation, something supported by the archaeological record.
An assessment of the Las Vegas Springs conducted by the railroad in 1906 revealed a
flow of 6,400 acre-feet. Using today’s standards of water use, that output is enough to
support 25,600 people (1 acre-foot per family of four per year). This total is more than
enough for groups of hunter/gatherer Indians.13 Indeed, it was enough to support the
Valley’s population well into the twentieth century.
The Valley’s inhabitants relied on the Las Vegas springs until the 1950s, which may
seem odd considering the proximity of the Colorado River, which lies only twenty miles
east of Las Vegas. Whereas the river currently serves as southern Nevada’s prime watersource, it only became accessible during the 1930s when the impounded water behind
Hoover Dam rose to a point at which it could be siphoned off and sent to the Valley’s
residents. Prior to the dam’s construction, however, the inhabitants of the Las Vegas
Valley could make little use of the river. The rugged terrain and dramatic geographic
relief between the Las Vegas Valley and the river made it impossible to utilize its waters
except along its riverbanks. Joseph Ives, an army officer who explored the lower
Colorado River, was quite intimidated by the perpendicular walls of the canyons just east
of the Las Vegas Valley, stating that they were likely over a thousand feet high. Ives
wanted to lead his expedition out of the canyon and into the surrounding region, but
finding this impossible, had to float back down the river thirty miles to a point at which
they could leave the river’s course and explore the region on land.14 The Colorado

12

Joseph Tingley, Becky Purkey, Ernest Duebendorfer, Eugene Smith, Jonathan Price, and Stephen Castor,
Geologic Tours in the Las Vegas Area (Reno: Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology, 2001), 123.
13
John F. Cahlan, Water: A History of Las Vegas, v.1. (Las Vegas: Las Vegas Valley Water District, 1975).
14
United States, Report Upon the Colorado River of the West (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969).
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River’s importance for human habitation has steadily increased, and has become the main
fuel source for the growth explosion that occurred in the postwar American Southwest,
but this is the result of twentieth century technological improvements. Prior to Hoover
Dam the sole source of water in the Las Vegas Valley was the artesian springs that
discharged the ancient snowmelt of the Spring Mountains.
Early Las Vegas history follows the same path as that of most other Intermountain
western cities. These settlements were early sites of Indian habitation that were later
taken over by Euro-Americans. The archaeological record indicates that both Pueblo and
Paiutes utilized the Las Vegas Valley’s plentiful water sources for centuries. During the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Indians were moved off the land when EuroAmericans, in this case Mormons, moved in. While there is significant evidence that the
Anasazi Indians practiced farming in the Las Vegas Valley, the Mormon settlers initiated
a system of agriculture that appropriated local water supplies more intensively than any
previous group of humans. This had the effect of displacing many of the Paiute Indians
who inhabited the valley as Mormons settled there, and who had previously relied on the
springs to support their hunting and gathering circuits throughout the region. The
Mormon settlers began limited ranching and farming in the Las Vegas Valley, a trend
that lasted well into the twentieth century. Mining, which established hundreds of
western cities, also played a role in Las Vegas history. While there was no mining in the
Las Vegas Valley itself, the town served as a trading post first for the 49ers on their way
to California, and later for gold and silver strikes in Goldfield, Tonopah, Eldorado
Canyon, and Searchlight, all located in Nevada.

13

Lastly, like scores of other towns throughout the region, Las Vegas felt the influence
of the railroad. While the Las Vegas Valley was inhabited prior to the railroad’s arrival, it
was not an official town, but rather, a scattered collection of ranches. At the turn of the
twentieth century the railroad chose to make Las Vegas a stopover point on its line from
Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, and its choice had everything to do with the water
available in the Valley. The railroad purchased land near the course of the Las Vegas
Creek, located in present day downtown, and then sold it at auction, thus creating the City
of Las Vegas. This followed a trend of railroads establishing towns throughout the West,
in places such as Battle Mountain, Winnemucca, Elko, Lovelock, Laramie, and
Cheyenne.
Humans have used the Las Vegas Valley as a trade route throughout the archeological
and historical record. The reason for this consistent use comes in the form of the springs
that dot the Valley. The Pueblo Indians, whose history stretches over 1,500 years, left
undeniable evidence that they used the Las Vegas Springs.15 This branch, referred to as
the Virgin Anasazi, represents the western most extension of a culture that stretched from
the Virgin River east into central Colorado and south into northern Arizona and New
Mexico. The main settlement for the Virgin Anasazi was along the Muddy and Virgin
rivers northeast of present day Las Vegas, a location in which extensive irrigated
agriculture was practiced. Since evidence of irrigated agriculture in the Las Vegas Valley
has yet to be discovered, archaeologists think the springs represented a forward hunting
base for the Puebloans. For over fifteen hundred years, they were able to thrive in this hot
corner of Nevada through careful management of water and through community
cooperation. While the Anasazi are best known for their ornate pueblo dwellings, the
15

Warren, The Las Vegas Springs: A Disappeared Resource.

14

communal network of canals and irrigation trenches they built was equally as impressive.
These artificial waterways, which radiated from riverbeds, provided the Indians with a
reliable water supply for farmland and for domestic use in their multi-storied adobe
structures. The best-known example of Anasazi architecture in Nevada is the Pueblo
Grande, or Big House, which was located near the present town of Overton, Nevada.
Pueblo Grande stood as one of the largest pre-Columbian structures in North America
until the waters of Lake Mead engulfed it in the 1930s.16 This eighty-four-room adobe
building was a testament to the success of the Anasazi’s water management system and
its ability to support a rather large population even in harsh desert conditions. By
manipulating the local water supplies through above ground irrigation systems and by
developing cooperative distribution systems, the Anasazi thrived for over a millennium.
Sometime during the twelfth century, Anasazi culture in the American Southwest totally
collapsed. According to archeologists, their disappearance coincided with a massive and
prolonged drought, which probably caused their demise. The severe and sudden
environmental changes may have been too much for their water management system.
The Paiute Indians arrived in the region about four hundred years before the Anasazi’s
departure and developed a different land ethic and system of water usage. Unlike the
Anasazi, the Paiutes were hunters and gatherers. Rather than producing most of their
food, they chose a more nomadic lifestyle, following game and collecting various plants
throughout the year. They depended on an intimate knowledge of local springs, streams,
and Tinajas—water basins carved into stone. Cooperation was central to Paiute survival
in the desert. The Paiute Indians organized themselves into small bands of twelve to
fifteen individuals. These bands were very loosely connected, but they respected each
16

James W. Hulse, The Silver State, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1998), 22-23.
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other’s hunting grounds. None of these groups sought to exercise control over local water
sources either. The limited supply and geographic distance between springs inspired
teamwork among them. One band shared its water supply with a neighboring group in
need, with the expectation that the favor would be reciprocated when there was a reversal
of fortune. 17
Even though there are few visible remnants of their historic settlements today, the
Paiute Indians offer a remarkable example of how to manage scarce natural resources in
the Mojave Desert. The key to their success was close cooperation among different
constituencies for the desert’s finite supply of water and a keen knowledge of its
environmental conditions and limits. The arrival of Euro-Americans in southern Nevada
during the nineteenth century radically altered the desert environment and the Paiutes’
way of life.
The Mormons were the first non-native settlers to the Las Vegas Valley, and they
represented a radical departure from previous land/water use precedents. They were the
first people to pursue enact a sedentary lifestyle in the Las Vegas Valley, a prospect made
possible, in part, by irrigated agriculture. The close knit and homogenous Mormons also
relied on a system of communal ownership of water and carefully planned collective
effort. This method of administering water originated farther north in the Salt Lake
Valley of Utah, the heart of the Mormon culture region. As a result of frequent religious
persecution, the Saints developed a close-knit social system that dominated all aspects of
Mormon life. Water policy fell within that ethos.

17

Martha Knack, Boundaries Between: The Southern Paiutes, 1775-1995 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2004), 10-29.
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As a result of religious oppression, Brigham Young led the Saints westward out of
Iowa to The Salt Lake Valley in present-day Utah. They immediately set about
solidifying their claim over their geographic surroundings. Brigham Young chose the
Salt Lake Valley because of its remote location. The Saints had been displaced numerous
times in the more populated East, and this western location afforded them enough
distance from prejudice to build their culture. Young realized that a geographic buffer
built on distance and rugged topography was a beneficial attribute given the level of
intolerance he and his followers had previously experienced. He also realized that in
order to create a successful empire, brisk trade and commerce were essential. The
Saints, not content to merely control their local surroundings in northern Utah, began
expanding their network to the north, west, and south. Their reasons were both defensive
and economic.
The Mormons expanded their empire by building successive bases (towns) radiating
outward from Salt Lake City. Mormons used these towns as supply points to expand to
the next site, a leapfrog approach. This proved to be a vital tactic in the overall Mormon
strategy. Utah, unlike its coastal neighbors California and Oregon, was deeply embroiled
in Indian warfare in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Mormon villages faced
the very real possibility of attack. Many of the Mormon settlements resembled ancient
European forts, complete with city walls and breastworks to repel attack. This network
of towns was an essential tool in Mormon control of the eastern Great Basin.18
One natural avenue of expansion was to the southwest along the front of mountain
ranges that trended in that direction. Young wanted to increase trade, leading ultimately
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to the prospering California markets. He finally realized this goal when a group of
missionaries purchased land and created a mission in San Bernardino in 1851.19 Crucial
to this southwestern expansion were the series of supply points that provided logistical
support along the route between Utah and the Pacific coast. One of the most vital points
along the passage was the Las Vegas Valley, site of lush meadows and perennial springs,
attributes that gave rise to its name (Las Vegas translates to “the meadows” in Spanish).
The contrast between the harsh Mojave Desert and the reliable and substantial springs
and the towns geographic isolation hundreds of miles distant from additional settlements
and water sources gave Las Vegas an importance far greater than its size would suggest.
In 1855 Young sent thirty missionaries to the Las Vegas Valley to build a settlement.
The Mormons constructed an adobe fort three miles east of the springs, along the
watercourse of the Las Vegas Creek. They laid out plots of land and began farming. The
communitarian ethic that had proved successful further north in Utah was employed at
the new mission. John Steele, president of the Las Vegas Mission, describes how “all
hands [were] busy making water ditches, roads, plowing, and planting.”20 Corn,
tomatoes, melons, squash, oats, and beans were but a few of the crops the Mormons
raised at the Mission.21 The Saints traded with migrants moving through the Valley and
interacted with, sometimes even baptizing, the local Paiutes. While their mission was
ostensibly one of peace, it did have an unintended dark side.
The Mormons initiated a policy of intensive use of the Valley’s water supply,
radically altering the land use ethic that had prevailed to that point. The Mormons viewed
their utilization of water for irrigated agriculture as benign; but their actions displaced
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much of the indigenous flora and fauna, which eliminated a primary source of sustenance
for the Paiutes. Early explorers noted the abundant water supply of the Las Vegas Springs
observing that it “was forty-five feet in diameter” and that it “contain[ed] the clearest and
purest water.” These sources go on to describe the spring’s upwelling as being so strong
that “It is positively impossible for a man to sink over his head in it.” 22 Despite these
favorable accounts describing a seemingly inexhaustible water supply, agricultural use
appropriated most of the spring’s flow. The Indians then began to raid agricultural fields
for crops and cattle, and were unfairly characterized as thieves by the Mormons who
failed to realize the impact of their land use practices. The Indians’ occasional use of the
springs guarded against overexploitation of local resources. When the Mormons built the
fort it upset this balance, although not as much as the practices of later settlers in the
valley. The Mormons only represented the first stage of a new water policy that would
increasingly dominate the Las Vegas Valley in the coming decades.
The Mormons left the Las Vegas Valley after only two years of habitation. Originally
envisioned as a supply depot along the Salt Lake City/San Bernardino route, the
settlement’s mission expanded to include lead mining in the Spring Mountains. For
several months missionaries mined for lead on Mt. Potosi, southwest of the Las Vegas
Valley. For a while the mission had enough surplus food and resources gained through
trade and local agriculture to support mining operations in the mountains above town.
There were several springs between the fort and the mine, which made travel back and
forth possible. However, the added task of mineral extraction soon proved too much
responsibility for the fledgling mission, dividing loyalties between William Bringhurst,
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the president of the Mission, and Nathaniel Jones, the leader of the mining operation, so,
with Brigham Young’s consent, it was abandoned in 1858.23 The environmental margin
of error is very small in the Mojave Desert. The Mormons may have been able to persist
and continue the settlement, but the division among the settlers over their mission and
potential warfare with the federal government over anti-polygamy laws made LDS
presence in the valley a costly proposition. Mormon leaders weighed the costs and
realized that it would simply take too many resources to continue maintaining the fort;
thus, the Mormon Church hierarchy ordered it closed.
Ranching in the Valley continued after the Mormons’ departure and was practiced on
a limited basis until the 20th century. Early settlers like Octavius Gass, Helen Stewart,
and Conrad Kiel used the water that flowed from the Las Vegas Springs to raise cattle
and crops and traded with travelers crossing the valley on their way to California. The
valley’s ranchers continued the Mormon practice of using the water that passed though
their property to irrigate crops and provide for livestock. Employing water in this fashion
slowly became institutionalized legally as the riparian doctrine. This doctrine evolved in
the wetter climates of France, England, and the eastern United States. It holds that water
belongs to those individuals whose land abuts a waterway and requires that the water be
restored to its original course after it is used.24 Helen Stewart, one of the first ranchowners in the Valley, utilized water from the Las Vegas creek in this fashion.
While the Mormons and Stewart both used water more intensively than their Indian
predecessors, a new chapter of truly intensive water use was about to emerge, one that
relied on water engineering and the total appropriation of local water supplies.
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In 1901 Senator William Clark of Montana began building the San Pedro, Los Angeles,
and Salt Lake Railroad (SPLA&SL). The railroad chose Las Vegas as a way station for
the same reason that the Indians, Mormons, and ranchers did; the ready source of water.
The steam-powered locomotives of the era were in constant need of being replenished
with water. Places with a naturally occurring source of water were logical sites for
railroad way stations. In places where there was no water, it was simply brought in by
train.
Senator Clark’s selection of Las Vegas as a stopover point for the railroad initiated the
most profound change in water use locally to that point. Immediately upon entering Las
Vegas the railroad set about buying water rights from the scattered ranches in the valley.
In 1902 Senator Clark purchased 1,864 acres of land and water rights from Helen
Stewart, who operated a ranch and way station at the Las Vegas Springs. While the
Indians and Mormons functioned under a communal system, the railroad instituted a
system of private ownership of water and jealously guarded its water supply, utilizing it
to the fullest degree. The railroad exercised ownership and control over the Las Vegas
Springs until 1948, when local citizens voted to buy out the railroad and created a
publicly owned water utility.25
The creation of Las Vegas followed a trend that played out scores of times throughout
the West. The railroad auctioned off its surplus land and created a town. For Las Vegas
this occurred in 1905. Water for the new town was supplied by the railroad’s subsidiary
company, the Las Vegas Land and Water Company (LVL&W). The influx of people and
capital, both the result of the railroad, spawned the city of Las Vegas and later inspired
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the creation of Clark County. Las Vegas had been a part of Lincoln County until 1909,
when the legislation created Clark County to better serve the growing local population.
Pioche had been the county seat in the 1870s, but it was prone to boom and bust
economic cycles typical of mining communities. In the early twentieth century, Pioche
was losing population as its mines played out. Las Vegas’ star was rising, however, and
this opened the door for its eventual selection as the Clark County seat.
It is important to recognize the importance of mining to the economic and legal
development of the American West, and Nevada in particular. Mining drew hundreds of
thousands of migrants to the region, and was the basis for granting statehood to several
western territories, including Nevada, in 1864. Additionally, mining had a profound
impact on water law, beginning in the streams and rivers that flow down the western
slope of the Sierra Nevada.
In the January of 1848, James Marshall unwittingly shaped the course of Western
American history when he discovered gold in California. Staring down into the
American River, Marshall noticed flecks of a bright yellow metal by his feet. These
turned out to be the first small fragments of one of the largest gold deposits ever before
discovered in the world. The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in central California was
not only the death knell for many American Indian communities, it also dramatically
altered land use practices, including especially how people thought about, used, and
negotiated for water in the region.
Spurred on by Marshall’s example, people scrambled across the continent by foot,
wagon, and boat in search of instant wealth hidden in the waterways and mountains of
California. Because there were no existing laws to regulate gold mining, miners created
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an informal legal system, or honor code, based on the premise of “first in time, first in
right.” The code provided some semblance of order and helped protect claims from
theft. This code evolved to include water rights, because one of the main prerequisites of
gold mining was access to water. In the practice of placer mining, miners used river water
to sift through gravel with their pans to expose precious metals. With hydraulic mining,
they used hoses connected to nearby water sources to literally wash away mountains in
order to expose the ore embedded in the earth. Miners often prospected in areas not
immediately adjacent to water sources, and they soon began constructing conveyance
systems, such as flumes, to power their rockers and sifters. This de facto recognition of
water rights was later codified and designated the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation.
Under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, the first person to divert water from a
natural source for “beneficial use” had the right to its use in the future over any other
competing interests. Initially “beneficial use” referred only to mining but later expanded
to include ranching, farming and domestic use. The Doctrine was predicated on the
philosophy of “use it or lose it,” which historically discouraged cooperation and
encouraged wasteful practices as holders of water rights sought to maintain their claims,
whether they continued to need all of the water allocated to them or not. Nevertheless,
the Right of Prior Appropriation became the recognized water allocation system and the
legal foundation for water law in eleven western states, including Nevada.26
As the mines of northern California played out, prospectors began searching
elsewhere for precious metals. Word of new discoveries in nearby northern Nevada
sparked a rush to Washoe (as the region was then known) in the 1860s. The mines of the
Comstock Lode in Virginia City and Gold Hill proved exceptionally rich, and, as in
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California, water was essential to their development. The infrastructure of these mines
was built with logs that were floated down flumes from the Lake Tahoe basin to
collection points just north and south of Carson City, at which point horse-teams, and
later rail, took them to Virginia City. Mining engineers also erected a pipeline that
transported water from Marlette Lake, an augmented reservoir situated above Lake Tahoe
in the Carson Range, across Washoe Valley to Virginia City (a distance of over twentyfive miles) in order to support mining operations and other businesses and settlements
that developed alongside them. As a result of the influx of population, Nevada was able
to secure statehood in October of 1864. Mining was a factor in several western state’s
creations; Colorado in 1876, Montana in 1889, and Idaho in 1890. The second great
wave of mining occurred in Tonopah and Goldfield in 1905, the same year that Las
Vegas was created. These new mining settlements soon began producing enormous
amounts of gold and silver that triggered a population boom which may have saved
Nevada from losing its statehood. The population had sunk to 47,355 by 1890, and the
continued decline of the state’s mining industry threatened to bankrupt the state
economy. Prior to the Goldfield/Tonopah mineral strikes there was Congressional
discussion over the possibility of revoking Nevada’s statehood and reverting it back to
territorial status.27 While thousands streamed into the central part of the state, Las Vegas
enjoyed the benefit of being a supply point for Bullfrog Mining District and other areas.
Interestingly, the Goldfield and Tonopah gold strikes occurred during the automobile era.
While these mining towns were reminiscent of the earlier Comstock Lode of legend,
migrants, like future governor Tasker Oddie were now able to rent automobiles, departing
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from Las Vegas, in order to travel to the diggings.28 Oddie later pushed the Oddie-Colton
Highway Act of 1927 through Congress which authorized the federal government to pay
one hundred percent of the cost of highways crossing federal land and Indian
reservations—a reform crucial to Nevada’s development.29 The mining region also
spurred the growth of a rail connection between the two locations, further augmenting
trade and commerce and increasing Las Vegas’ importance as a trade-hub.
The mining boom petered out fairly quickly in southern Nevada compared to the
North, yet there were some notable mining operations in the region. The most significant
mines in southern Nevada were located in El Dorado Canyon, thirty-five miles southeast
of Las Vegas. The neighboring towns of Searchlight, Death Valley Junction, Pioche, and
Beatty were all founded on mining at the turn of the twentieth century. At that time, Las
Vegas served as only a minor trading post helping to supply the relatively small number
of miners and businesses associated with these gold mining operations. While most of
the mining towns were deserted within a few years of their establishment, Las Vegas
began an expansion, the magnitude of which a century later, no one would have predicted
at the time.
As Las Vegas grew slowly it was drawn into the aegis of a second empire, that of Los
Angeles. At the time of the Las Vegas land auction in 1905, Los Angeles was a city of
more than 170,000 people and was just beginning to realize its imperial potential.30 While
Mormon territorial and economic expansion had proven untenable, that of Los Angeles
proved far more enduring, influencing Las Vegas to the present day.
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Real estate and expansionism were the two main factors driving growth in Los
Angeles at the turn of the twentieth century. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce
was constantly extolling the benefits of growth locally and nationally. One of the chief
selling points was the thriving agricultural market. The Los Angeles Basin is
environmentally well suited to support the cultivation of many high-value crops, and this
made farming there a potentially lucrative endeavor. Citrus farmers, owning only a
fraction of the land acreage possessed by their eastern wheat-growing counterparts, were
bringing money in hand over fist. Stories of instant wealth were the chamber of
commerce’s main export. The railroad, which helped launch the city’s success in 1876
was an indispensable ally of the L.A. Chamber of Commerce and aided it by exporting
high value crops and stories of instant farming wealth, and by importing the people who
wanted to partake in the fabulous lifestyle available in Southern California. The
wintertime arrival of citrus fruits to frigid eastern states contributed significantly to the
Los Angeles image of sunshine and plenty. Southern California was now turning
Brigham Young’s earlier drive for markets on its head; now, California was exploiting
the vast interior of the American West, staking claim to its new hinterland. And once
again, Las Vegas found itself in the middle.
Water acquisition in Los Angeles was vital to the city’s continued economic success.
Los Angeles, while semi-arid, benefited from substantial local water supplies. The
mountains that create the Los Angeles basin rise to over 11,000 feet in elevation, thereby
capturing and conveying significant amounts of water to the city. Both the Santa Ana
and Los Angeles Rivers coursed through the basin, and artesian water underlay the entire
area. Enormous growth rapidly overwhelmed these supplies however, and local business
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leaders began to look beyond the immediate vicinity for additional water sources that
could fuel future growth.
Rampant boosterism aided Los Angeles in its quest for more water. In 1905 Los
Angeles was well on its way toward acquiring additional water from the Owens Valley
and later the Colorado River. The city’s booster mentality extended to Las Vegas since
California business leaders owned the railroad and its land; Senator William Clark and
his company applied the real estate boom strategy that had driven the southern California
economy for years to Las Vegas. The Los Angeles Times advertised the Las Vegas land
auction and announced free railroad fares for those individuals purchasing lots.31 Present
throughout the advertisements were assurances of a convenient and plentiful water
supply. As land was auctioned off in Las Vegas, Los Angeles acted on its designs for the
Owens River. Even though these events were unrelated, their coincidence represents the
increased power and growth of western cities and their need for resources. Even before
completing the aqueduct conveying the Owens River to Los Angeles in 1913, the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) had its eyes on the Colorado River
as a potential future source of water. Los Angeles’ growth mentality fed more growth,
and boosters always had their eyes on the future.
At the turn of the twentieth century, California cities were displaying their first signs
of maturation, long before their counterparts in the Intermountain West. This took the
form of urban imperialism. Los Angeles and San Francisco had outgrown their local
water supplies and were looking to distant locations to import water. Neither Los
Angeles nor San Francisco actually had a shortage of water when they initiated their
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actions; rather, they were solidifying control over water for future growth. This
illustrates the influence that growth exerts over the local population, since both cities had
support from a majority of their residents who saw their future affected by their city’s
ability to expand. (The voters of Los Angeles and San Francisco repeatedly supported
bond measures funding water projects). Growth meant prosperity, and coupled with the
Progressive Era ethos of “the greatest good for the greatest number,” the process of
acquiring distant sources of water, while detrimental for a few, would be beneficial to a
much larger population. Los Angeles was the first of the two cities to look beyond its
immediate hinterland for additional water. Engineers from the LADWP located an ideal
source in the Owens River Valley north of Los Angeles. Officials considered it ideal
because, despite the mountains north of Los Angeles, the entire watercourse flowed
downhill. At no point along the line would water have to be lifted. This proved doubly
enticing since the water could be used to generate electric energy as it descended toward
Los Angeles. After eight years of legal maneuvering and construction, the aqueduct
began delivering water in 1913.32 While growth provided the incentive for Los Angeles’
forays into the Owens Valley, a geologic catastrophe provided the impetus for San
Francisco’s hydraulic ambitions.
The San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 resulted in widespread fires that incinerated a
significant portion of the city. Almost immediately following the disaster city leaders
began calling for a more reliable water source in case of future emergencies. Officials
located an ideal site in the Hetch Hetchy Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. It was
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perfectly situated east of San Francisco and at a sufficient elevation (3,772 feet above sea
level) that no costly pumping would be necessary. In spite of these advantages, one
geographical fact threatened to interfere with San Francisco’s ambitions: the valley is
located entirely within Yosemite National Park. After a monumental struggle that
involved the Sierra Club, and San Francisco’s business and political leadership, a fight
that extended all the way to the president of the United States, the city procured the site,
flooded the valley, and began delivering water to constituents in the Bay Area. By the
time Los Angeles and San Francisco began receiving water from their hinterlands, Las
Vegas was still a small western town that had an ample local water supply.33
While cities throughout the West were busy pursuing agendas for economic and social
expansion, the Federal government was simultaneously engaged in the same process.
The effect of the national government on western settlement cannot be overstated.
Numerous federal laws and support, including the Homestead and Morrill Land Grant
Acts (1862), Desert Lands Act (1877), Dawes Severalty Act (1887), Reclamation Act
(1902), and the Enlarged Homestead Act (1909) did much to populate the West. The
Reclamation Act was especially anticipated in many western areas since it represented
federal assistance in combating the region’s overriding aridity by creating the necessary
infrastructure for a viable economic venture through agriculture. The Act reflected
Progressive Era politics, which emphasized technology as a solution to society’s
problems. Congressman Francis G. Newlands of Nevada sponsored the bill, and was
supported by President Roosevelt who signed it into law in 1902. While the first of the
nation’s reclamation projects was slated for Nevada, the newly created Bureau of
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Reclamation located the first project in northern Nevada east of Reno and Carson City
along the Truckee and Carson Rivers and had no impact in the south. Reclamation later
benefited southern Nevada, but not until the construction of Hoover Dam in the 1930s.
As an ever-increasing number of urban areas ranged farther afield for resources, water
management became a regional rather than a local issue in the American Southwest
during the early twentieth century, beginning with the Roosevelt Dam east of Phoenix,
Arizona. The linchpin for the region was the Colorado River, “the most litigated,
contested, and divided waterway in the world,” and that is where California focused its
lobbying efforts in congress. 34 In an effort to divert river water for its own use,
California planned to build a dam on the Colorado River. California’s economy had
matured far earlier than those of other western states, and agribusiness in the Imperial
Valley pressured government officials for irrigation water and protection against
flooding. In 1922 Phil Swing, a congressman from the Imperial Valley, and Senator
Hiram Johnson, the progressive senator and former governor of California, introduced
legislation calling for the construction of a high dam in or around Boulder Canyon on the
Colorado River. For several years the upper basin states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming,
New Mexico, as well as lower basin Arizona, were able to block the bill’s passage;
however, in 1922 the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of prior appropriation applied
to states, as well as individuals. As a result of its precocious development, California was
definitely the “first in time,” which meant it was “first in right.” The Court’s ruling
spurred the upstream states into action. Fearing that their water rights were in jeopardy,
the upriver states agreed to stop stonewalling California’s attempts to get a high dam built
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on the Colorado River, if California would agree to a distribution of the river among the
states. The agreement came to be known as the Colorado River Compact of 1922.35
During the negotiations, representatives agreed to divide the Colorado River Basin
into an upper and lower basin. The Upper Basin included the states of Wyoming,
Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico, and the Lower Basin the states of Nevada, Arizona,
and California. Each basin was permitted to develop up to 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) of
river water annually. The 1920 population of the Colorado River basin states followed by
their allotment of Colorado River water are as follows: Arizona-334,162/2.8 million acre
feat (MAF); California-3,426, 861/4.4 MAF; Colorado-939,000/3.88 MAF; Nevada77,407/300,000 acre-feet; New Mexico-360,350/843,750 acre-feet; Utah-449,396/1.7
MAF; and Wyoming-194,402/1.05 MAF.36 The Compact secured the upper basin’s
portion of the river to use it in the future when the region had the population and
economic maturity to do so, and allowed for the lower basin’s immediate development of
it. California still received the lion’s share of the river water at 4.4 million acre-feet, a
portion approaching a third of the entire river’s flow. Nevada received only 300,000
acre-feet.37
Nevada was not a major player during the negotiations. It had neither the population
nor the potential for agriculture that the other six Basin States possessed. This is one of
the main reasons why Nevada received so little water compared to the other states, and
why the delegation did not protest the amount allotted. However, Nevada was not a
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completely disinterested party. In 1920, Nevada Governor Emmet Boyle appointed a
commission, later to become the Colorado River Commission, to pursue Nevada’s
interests on the Colorado River. Later during Compact talks the delegation was willing
to forgo larger amounts of water because it saw potential in hydroelectric power for local
industrial purposes, and the fact that the dam site, located in Nevada, would bring
significant capital to the state. While the Nevada delegation’s failure to secure more
water may seem shortsighted to the twenty-first century observer, it is important to bear
in mind that in 1922, when the Compact was ratified, the Las Vegas Valley was home to
less than 3,000 people, and the modest agricultural operations were still amply supplied
with either surface water from the Las Vegas springs, or groundwater.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 marks a pivotal turning point in Las Vegas
history, because the town transitioned from a small ranching and railroad community to a
bustling center of trade and tourism, forever changed by the government’s decision to
build the nation’s largest multi-purpose dam to that point. The development of federal
public works projects and the legalization of gambling coincided to create what is now a
world-famous desert metropolis. The most substantial and long-lasting government works
project in southern Nevada was the construction of the Hoover Dam from 1931 to 1935.
Workers, who came from across the nation, scaled the cliffs of Black Canyon thirty miles
east of Las Vegas. They blasted and drilled the red rock, poured millions of tons of
concrete, and ultimately produced a dam of monumental proportions. After the dam’s
completion, the Nevada Legislature increased the Colorado River Commission’s
influence by increasing its membership from four to five, giving it greater funding, and
by requiring commissioners to be more highly qualified. This made the Commission
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more effective in pursuing its state-mandated goal to acquire and develop southern
Nevada’s share of water and hydropower. Over time, the CRC would work in tandem
with other water management organizations in the region to manage water and power
resources.
As the waters of Lake Mead rose behind Hoover Dam in 1935-36, so too did the level
of Federal expenditure in southern Nevada. Government wages found their way into
local banks and businesses, financed community development, such as Boulder City, and
greatly stimulating the southern Nevada economy. Hoover Dam’s construction led to
additional government projects in the state, including: the Basic Magnesium Plant and the
United States Army Aerial Gunnery Range (later renamed Nellis Air Force Base) in
1940-1941, and the Nevada Test Site in the 1950s, where the U.S. Department of
Defense, and (after 1978) Energy tested nuclear weapons until the 1992 moratorium.
And while technically a private company, Basic Magnesium, Incorporated (BMI), a
company responsible for making magnesium ingots for airplane and bomb manufacturers
in southern California, benefited greatly from the federal government’s Defense Plant
Corporation building its factory in the surrounding Basic Townsite (later Henderson), to
house its workforce. These projects combined to create something that had long eluded
southern Nevada—economic diversification and a stable foundation for future growth.
During the Depression, thousands of people nationwide were unemployed and, despite
the dam construction boom around Las Vega, Nevada was no exception. In a desperate
attempt to revive the state’s economy, Phil Tobin, a first-year assemblyman from
Humboldt County, introduced a bill in 1931 to re-legalize gaming.38 The state legislature
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quickly passed the bill and signed it into law. Initially, gaming had little impact on the
state economy, and even less on water policy; but, Tobin’s bill catalyzed a building
frenzy in Las Vegas that continued until 2008-09.
California entrepreneur Thomas Hull was among the first to capitalize on the new
gaming law and built a sprawling hotel resort and casino, which he named the El Rancho,
Vegas in 1941. He located the resort on the outskirts of Las Vegas, just over the
municipal boundary, to avoid paying city taxes.39 The success of this resort spurred the
construction of others along the Los Angeles Highway, giving rise to what became the
Las Vegas Strip. In addition to live entertainment, fine dining and luxurious hotel rooms,
Hull made water the centerpiece of his hotel. An expansive swimming pool, lush
gardens, and an outdoor waterfall combined to create the illusion of an oasis in the desert.
Las Vegas entrepreneurs have since continued to imitate Hull’s example, as evidenced by
the lagoons, waterfalls, and fountains that are now prominent features of the Strip. Hull’s
El Rancho buoyed the southern Nevada economy, but it also set in motion a building
boom that would consume more and more water from a region that had little to spare.
From the turn of the century until the early 1940s when Hull built the El Rancho, the
Las Vegas Land & Water Company administered the water needs of the Las Vegas
Valley. During the first two decades of the twentieth century the LVL&W relied on
surface-water with which to provide the people of Las Vegas. However, in 1923 the
company was forced to drill a well into the aquifer underlying the Las Vegas Valley in
order to keep up with increasing population demands. Local residents also drilled private
wells. These practices worked reasonably well while Las Vegas was still a small town.
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But the Second World War changed everything. As federal jobs and the tourist industry
began to attract people to the area in ever-increasing numbers, the LVL&W could not
keep pace with the growth. In addition to growth pressure, lack of popular knowledge
about the scarcity of local water resources also contributed to water waste, which served
to further decrease supply and increase demand. The LVL&W’s reliance on local
groundwater limited its ability to expand water services, a fact that forced the company to
oppose further expansion of the local water infrastructure. The LVL&W claimed that it
was reluctant to expand its services, or make internal improvements, because it was a
Union Pacific entity and not a recognized public utility. The truth of the matter was that
the LVL&W simply could not develop further water sources for the community. This
action compelled many southern Nevadans to publicly call for a new approach to water
management, creation of a special service district—a reform enacted in Los Angeles and
other metropolitan areas. Still, local opinion makers like the Review Journal editor Al
Cahlan (an outspoken member of the Colorado River Commission), accused the company
of intentionally stifling growth and economic development in southern Nevada and raised
the possibility of future water supplies from Lake Mead.40 Before this could happen,
however, control of water management needed to be taken from the LVL&W.
In response to local water administrative and supply problems, the state government
created the Las Vegas Valley Water District (LVVWD) in 1947. After decades of feeling
neglected by the LVL&W and frustrated by their lack of control over local water
supplies, citizens, under the leadership of local activists, had demanded a publicly owned
water service from the state legislature. Lawmakers established the district as a not-for-

40

Cahlan and Jones, Water: A History of Las Vegas, v. I, ix.

35

profit organization governed by a Board of Directors composed of the publicly elected
Clark County Commissioners. Its original mission—to administer the water needs of the
Las Vegas Valley—continues to this day. The District’s board worked with the LVL&W
for seven years to transition from private to public ownership. The District took full
control in 1954. It immediately signed an agreement with BMI of Henderson that
allowed it to use the company’s pumping station and pipeline that had drawn water from
Lake Mead since 1941. The District then built a pipeline from Las Vegas southeast along
the Boulder Highway to the plant in Henderson, and in September, 1955, Colorado River
water from Lake Mead finally began to flow into Las Vegas, more than two decades after
the completion of Hoover Dam.41
Simultaneously, the District was busy expanding water mains and connecting the
Valley’s homes to the city’s water supply. The District also began installing meters at all
new construction sites in order to monitor water usage. The Nevada Division of Water
Resources, the state agency that manages surface, ground and well water in the state, also
began to issue temporary water permits, which, unlike historic water rights, could be
revoked. This permit system would have important consequences in the 1990s.
Most of these measures proved to be short-lived solutions to the region’s increasing
water demands. More water was needed to keep pace with the growing influx or
residents and visitors to the Las Vegas Valley. Yet the county could not afford to build
the utility infrastructure to keep up with growth. Working through the Colorado River
Commission, southern Nevada’s leaders turned to a partner who had come to their aid
before—the federal government.
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The construction of the Hoover Dam during the Great Depression had shown
southern Nevadans how much assistance the federal government could provide to the
area. The federal government had been involved in western water issues since the late
1880s when Nevada Senator William Stewart pushed for federal reclamation subsidies in
the arid region. He founded the national irrigation congress in 1891 and was able to
persuade future Nevada Senator Francis G. Newlands to support the measure in congress,
an effort that led to the creation of the Reclamation Act of 1902.42 The Reclamation Act
created the Reclamation Bureau (later changed to the Bureau of Reclamation), which sold
public land to fund “the construction and maintenance of irrigation works for the storage,
diversion, and development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands” in
the West.43 Congress created the Bureau to help farmers “reclaim” land from the desert,
and to turn it into productive farmland. Unlike the individual states, the federal
government had the financial and organizational resources necessary to build and
maintain large-scale systems to redistribute water from the deep canyons of the West to
the high plateaus and desert areas where people lived.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
increasingly supported urban as well as rural areas. This was especially true during the
post World War II era when urban populations throughout the West exploded. However,
this growth exerted a new pressure on the Bureau. In addition to water, the organization
was now scrambled to provide electricity as well. The USBR found itself in the
impossible position of trying please all people. In the early 1960s, Interior Secretary
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Stewart Udall proposed a comprehensive development plan, which came to be known as
the Colorado River Basin Plan, a project that called for a number of new dams along the
Colorado River, to include a pair on either side of Grand Canyon National Park. It also
included funding for the Central Arizona Project (CAP), a water system that would
deliver water from the Colorado River at Lake Havasu to the Phoenix Metropolitan area
and Tucson.
Senator Alan Bible of Nevada had been trying since at least 1960 to provide Las
Vegas with water from Lake Mead, and Udall agreed to include a pipeline project for Las
Vegas within the Pacific Southwest Water Plan (PSWP). However, this was not
necessarily a good thing in the eyes of Senator Bible.44 He was apprehensive about the
Nevada project being included in the PSWP for several reasons. First, California was
threatening to derail the entire process since it was unhappy with the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Arizona v. California (1963), that reaffirmed Arizona’s right to 2.8
million acre-feet per year from the Colorado. California had grown accustomed to using
the surplus water that flowed down the river, and the CAP threatened to diminish the
amount they were using. The last thing Bible wanted was for his small part of the overall
plan to disappear because of a legislative fight between California and Arizona, one that
threatened to derail the entire project. Bible also felt that Udall’s plan, especially the
dams in the Grand Canyon, were vulnerable to attacks from environmentalists, which in
fact later occurred. Bible had been a member of the Senate during the Echo Park Dam
controversy (1956) during which environmentalists effectively blocked the construction
of a dam within Dinosaur National Monument. For these reasons, Bible sought approval
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from Udall to introduce a separate bill for the Nevada project. After lobbying congress
and President Lyndon Johnson, Bible finally received the blessings of Udall and the
Arizona and California congressional delegations and introduced Senate Bill 32 on May
20, 1965, which called for the construction of a water delivery system capable of
conveying Nevada’s entire allotment of 300,000 acre-feet per year from Lake Mead. Five
months later, Johnson signed the bill funding the Southern Nevada Water System
(SNWS). The project, the first phase of which was completed in 1971, included
construction of six pumping plants, a regulatory reservoir, a four mile tunnel, and 31.4
miles of pipeline from Lake Mead to various points throughout the LVMA. The SNWS
represented a significant expansion and improvement upon Las Vegas’ existing water
system, to include the augmentation of the BMI pipeline. The construction of the SNWS
was a major turning point in the history of Las Vegas and its importance cannot be
overstated. Thanks to Bible’s efforts, Las Vegas now had the capacity to support a
metropolitan population of more than 2 million—far beyond the 30,000 residents and
visitors of the 1940s.
Despite Senator Bible’s valiant efforts, however, by the early 1990s Clark County’s
water needs began to tax the SNWS’s capabilities. The mass migration of retirees, a
booming gaming and tourist economy, along with a vibrant housing market attracted so
many people that the Las Vegas Metro Area consistently ranked as one of the fastest
growing regions in the United States from the 1970s to the mid 2000s. The entire state of
Nevada claimed only 180,083 inhabitants in 1950; by 1980, Clark County alone
possessed 582,000 residents, not including the thousands of visiting tourists.45 While the
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SNWS provided adequate water to the Valley, local municipalities increasingly battled
each other for a share of the river. The Colorado River Commission’s policy of allotting
water based on a municipality’s previous year’s usage led to some highly wasteful
practices. During the 1980s, instead of conserving water, each urban area sought to
maximize its usage in order to receive the same amount of water the next year. Boulder
City’s water managers even went so far as to uncap the town’s fire hydrants to guarantee
it would continue to receive the same annual allocation.46
Open competition and obvious hording and wasting of water inspired local water
managers and residents to pursue a better approach to regional water management.
Throughout the 1980s, and with increased urgency toward the end of the decade, public
forums, such as newspapers, community meetings, radio talk shows, and private meetings
between government officials from the Water District, North Las Vegas, Henderson, and
Boulder City wrestled with how to best distribute and conserve this precious natural
resource. The end result of this widespread community discussion was the creation of the
Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) in 1991.
The SNWA ushered in a new type of water management in the LVMA by making
cooperation instead of competition its governing principle. The SNWA brought all the
metropolitan area’s water purveyors to the same table and gave them each an equal stake
in the proceedings. Representatives of Boulder City, Henderson, Las Vegas, North Las
Vegas, Clark County, Big Bend Water District, and the Clark County Water Reclamation
District comprised the SNWA. All of them ceded their water rights to the new
organization in the interests of economic, ecological, and political efficiency. By
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bringing all the water utilities in Clark County together, SNWA took a bold step away
from the predominant “use it or lose it” ethos that had hamstrung cooperation and
conservation since the days of the Forty-Niners.
To see how this new cooperative model came into being, the next chapter will take an
in-depth look at the specific people, events, and issues that led to SNWA’s formation.
The process was anything but smooth and the results anything but predetermined.
Perhaps it is fitting and logical that Las Vegas would be the place to re-imagine western
water law and practices. After all, it was the ancestral home of the Anasazi and Paiutes
whose historic water management systems embodied the ethics of cooperation and
teamwork. With these precedents and ideas to guide it, the SNWA has sought to reinvent how the West governs water. It has striven to give every stakeholder a voice and
to make necessity and efficiency rather than waste and competition its managing
principles.
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CHAPTER 3

PARADIGM SHIFT: THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SNWA47
There had to be a better way. Competition for water had become fierce. In the history
of the western United States there have been dozens of instances when conflict and
litigation were the preferred methods of resolving water allocation disputes. In 1933,
Governor Benjamin Moeur of Arizona called on the National Guard to protect his state’s
Colorado River interests against California’s maneuvers to build another dam across this
major waterway.48 Within California, Owens Valley farmers have battled Los Angeles
for water ever since the city’s aqueduct began draining the valley in 1913. And closer to
home, in the 1970-80s, the Las Vegas Valley was the site of some of the worst infighting
among municipalities vying for limited water resources. Competition in the Valley had
intensified as growth rates drove demand for water to unprecedented levels. Clearly,
westerners needed to radically change their way of thinking about water and how they
managed it.
The SNWA helped to spearhead a philosophical shift; the shift from competition to
accommodation; from the pursuit of individual interests to the creation of partnerships;
from wasteful water practices to the institutionalization of conservation policies. The
47
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year 1991 marks the creation of the SNWA and a radically new way of managing water
in the West. Why was Las Vegas at the forefront of innovation? Who developed the
SNWA? What factors led to its creation? To answer these questions, this chapter will
revisit that moment in time when a diverse group of water administrators, scientists, and
policy makers came together to initiate an unprecedented water policy that made the
SNWA a model water management organization worldwide.
Since the construction of Hoover Dam and the Strip put Las Vegas on the map in the
1930-40s, growth has often outpaced regional planners’ population predictions, thereby
exacerbating already contentious water issues. In 1960 the Water District had estimated
that there would be 600,000 residents in the Valley by 2000; instead, that mark was
reached by 1970.49 But slow growth in the recession filled 1970s convinced many local
water planners that existing water supplies and infrastructure were adequate to support
the Valley into the next century. This perception quickly eroded during the next decade.
As David Donnelly, former Deputy Executive Director of the SNWA, explained in the
early 1980s, “the system was able to move 400 million gallons a day from the Colorado
River. And everybody thought that was enough water for as long as anybody will ever be
around.”50 Then, as SNWA General Manager Pat Mulroy observed, “The balloon
popped.”51
The opening of The Mirage casino in November 1989 ushered in the mega-resort era
of Las Vegas, an event that sparked a renaissance on the Strip and launched an
unprecedented period of growth, which quickly strained the Valley’s water resources.
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Annual water consumption rapidly increased from five to twenty-two percent and, by
1990, Clark County’s population had passed 740,000.52 “We saw that if we kept going
[at the same rate of growth],” explained Mulroy, “we were all going to run out of water at
the beginning of the 1990s.”53
This explosive growth confronted the Valley’s water planners with an enormous
challenge, one that was only compounded by the politically fragmented nature of the
valley. With three cities and the county, all competing to expand their tax base at each
other’s expense, regional planning was almost impossible. This decentralized system of
organization was highly inefficient and nowhere more so than in the area of water
management and distribution.
According to the Colorado River Compact and the Law of the River, the Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) was responsible for distributing water to the Colorado River
Commission of Nevada (CRC), which then allocated a specific amount to each local
municipality in the valley. As noted earlier, to maintain its yearly allotment, each city
felt compelled to use the amount it had previously received, regardless of need, or run the
risk of losing some of its allotment. Since the allotment process was based on use, it
unwittingly promoted waste and drained the region’s water supply at an ever-increasing
rate. Each purveyor felt it needed to vigorously defend its water allotment against the
other municipalities of the valley. “We were at war as water agencies,” stated Mulroy.54
Tensions among the Valley’s municipalities and the county often spilled over during
meetings with the CRC. Officials often shouted at each other, creating a sense of unease
and distrust among participants. Donnelly recalled that they “had a lot of fun being nasty
52

Ibid.
Rothman interview with Patricia Mulroy, April 26, 2005, author’s files.
54
Ibid.
53

44

to each other.”55 As SNWA’s Public Service Director Julie Wilcox noted, “Each city
wanted to protect its ability to grow.” 56 This desire contributed to conflict that worked
against finding a productive solution to the Valley’s water problems.
One of the first acts to transform the ineffectual and sometimes ruthless culture of
regional water management was to re-orient the District from an engineering-led
operation to a more provincial and administrative one. In 1984, Pat Pine, a former budget
director for the State of Nevada, replaced Don Path, who became the last engineer to lead
the District. Pine brought in county administrator Patricia Mulroy to assist him. Mulroy
subsequently replaced Pine in 1989 and brought with her an approach to management
that fostered consensus building. “With this new style,” explained Tom Minwegan, who
has been an engineer with the county since 1981, “you break down barriers and work
more effectively together.”57
One of Pine’s most significant contributions was to recommend that the District call
in Water Resources Management, Incorporated (WRMI), a consulting firm based in
Columbia, Maryland, whose 1991 study would become the blueprint for the SNWA. The
company specialized in developing computer models to forecast population rates,
assessing water management systems, and creating workable solutions to problems of
inefficiency and waste. Local water managers hoped WRMI could help the Valley
redesign its disorganized distribution systems and provide more accurate forecasts of its
population growth. Improvement on both fronts was essential to staying on top of the
region’s water shortages. Furthermore, the USBR no longer wanted to be in the position
of allocating water to metropolitan agencies – much less arbitrating disputes among them
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– so the Valley needed to take greater control of managing its resources. The Valley’s
city and county managers agreed to retain WRMI to help them do just that.
Water Resources Management, Inc., working with the Center for Business and
Economic Research at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and Management
Consultants Limited of Carbondale, Illinois, submitted an evaluative report in early 1991.
Their research results were alarming. They concluded that the Valley would exhaust its
supply of both ground and Colorado River water by the mid-1990s, although it could
extend supplies until 2007 by immediately implementing conservation measures. The
WRMI report stunned the Las Vegas community. “At the end of that exercise, we all
realized that we were going to run out of water in 1992-1993,” Mulroy recalled, “and it
was just a matter or months before one of us [meaning one of the municipalities] was
going to go off the cliff first, second, or third.”58
The WRMI report was a wakeup call for urban planners throughout the region. It
made clear that there was not enough water to sustain the metropolitan area’s spiraling
growth. Rather than questioning the feasibility of continuing the development boom in
the desert, which some environmentalists suggested would be a wiser policy, the water
managers believed their task was to fulfill the wishes of local municipalities who
supported growth, though the most sustainable way possible. The WRMI report included
recommendations for developing a cooperative framework for solving regional water
issues and reversing the dire predictions of water shortages. The plan urged Valley water
purveyors to create policies that crossed rather than defined political jurisdictions.
Recognizing the disparities in municipalities’ size and population densities, it suggested
that they establish formulas for allocating capital and operational costs more equitably.
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In contrast to the competitive water use ethic of the past, the plan encouraged the joint
sharing of water during supply shortages.
Perhaps the most significant conservation measure the WRMI plan suggested was a
system of return-flow credits for municipalities that treated and then returned effluent
water to Lake Mead. This system of return flow credits could significantly boost
southern Nevada’s water supply, because it would allow purveyors to withdraw more
water than the state’s original Colorado River allotment as long as they treated and
returned it to the river. The return-flow credit system was actually a feature of the 1922
Compact; southern Nevada had just never exploited it. The WRMI now urged it to do so.
Transforming the WRMI plan into a workable reality would require water purveyors
of southern Nevada to completely restructure how they did business. George Forbes,
Boulder City manager, offered several suggestions for managing the metropolitan area’s
water. One scheme was for the CRC to increase its role and become a regional waterplanning agency. This option was problematic because the governor appointed the
members of the CRC from throughout the state and the purveyors wanted to ensure local
control of the Valley’s water supply. Another approach was for the District to assume
responsibility for the Valley. While it already had the power and infrastructure to step
into the role, this system flew in the face of the collective strategy that everyone was
working toward. There was also the “do nothing” option. Since this tactic would result
in the exhaustion of water supplies within a few years, purveyors never really considered
it.
One night, while meeting over dinner in Mesquite soon after WRMI had delivered its
proposal, several key figures in local water management, including representatives from

47

the District and from the towns of Henderson and North Las Vegas, struck on the idea of
creating a “super-agency” to implement WRMI’s plan. They agreed to pitch this idea to
their superiors when they got back to the Valley.
Once the idea was approved, an important first step towards the creation of this superagency, which would become the SNWA, was bringing together all the various
organizations that had a stake in the region’s water. Those involved were a veritable
“who’s who” of water organizations in southern Nevada. They included federal agencies,
such as the USBR and Nellis Air Force Base; state organizations, such as the CRC and
the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources; county agencies, such as
the District, Big Bend Water District, Clark County Sanitation District, Clark County
Water Reclamation District, and Clark County Department of Comprehensive Planning;
and all of the municipalities, including the cities of Boulder City, Henderson, Las Vegas,
and North Las Vegas.
To figure out how to allot water equitably amongst once adversarial groups, the
Valley’s water planners decided that each municipality should present a proposal to the
others. In the spirit of openness and cooperation, they insisted that the water officials
themselves conduct the meeting, not their legal counsels. As Donnelly recalls, “We had
this table, and we all had attorneys. We had our Colorado River attorneys. Henderson
had theirs. North Las Vegas had theirs. We made the attorneys sit on the outside of the
table [and] they could not talk….They could be in the room but they could not say
anything….It was a stressful and volatile process, but through it all everyone’s main
focus was the creation of the SNWA.”59
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One pivotal meeting among the various stakeholders was a showdown reminiscent of
the nineteenth-century West. As Donnelly remembers it, “We all came to the table [with
our proposals], and everyone looked around afraid to start what all thought would be a
long, drawn-out, and unpleasant round of negotiations…. [We each thought,] ‘Who is
going to go first? Who is going to be the first to turn up their cards?”’60 Then, the
District General Manager Patricia Mulroy took the lead. “She said: ‘I will turn mine’,”
Donnelly continued, “and she turned over her plan and said ‘this is how I think we should
do it.’ At that point, Henderson City Manager Phil Speight took his plan off the table and
put it into his brief case. Then the others followed suit. They were all happy with
Mulroy’s proposal.”61 Some sources credit the power of Mulroy’s personality for
bringing so many disparate and historically antagonistic interests together for the
common good. Speight contends, “She was able to develop trust with all of the
administrators as well as the political leaders of each of the entities through her work
ethic.”62
Before solidifying this new cooperative agreement, the district attorney encouraged
the Valley’s water purveyors to assess the amount of water already committed to
development. So at the height of negotiations, the District called a temporary
moratorium on “will-serve” letters, which were commitments for water service the
agency provided to builders. To receive bank financing, developers had to show that the
District would supply water to the project. In the past, the District had indiscriminately
fulfilled the developers’ requests because there was so much local support for growth,
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and because prior to 1991 there was less concern over water shortages. As a result, the
District did not keep a close accounting of the promised water commitments. Mulroy
recalls, “We had no clue how many will-serve letters were out there.”63
The District ceased issuing will-serve letters to developers on February 14, 1991, a
move that became known as the “St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.”64 Because so much of
southern Nevada’s economy rested on construction and growth, the withholding of willserve letters sent shock waves throughout the community.65 The District planned to lift
the suspension once it had determined existing water commitments and the Valley had a
new water management system in place.
Meanwhile, the Valley’s water purveyors continued to work on transforming the
WRMI’s proposal into a fully integrated and cooperative program. There were two
central issues at stake: how the water was to be divided among the purveyors and how
each purveyor would be represented within the larger organization. Although the system
would change radically after the creation of SNWA, the purveyors initially followed
WRMI’s advice and agreed to allocate water based on economic formulas of growth
predictions. Each purveyor would thus receive a set percentage of water based on these
forecasts.
The group also established safeguards to protect the individual interests of purveyors
who were in essence giving up control of their destiny by partnering with the others. The
purveyors adopted a flexible collaborative agreement that protected the rights of the
smaller municipalities. Officials decided that each of the five water purveyors, which
included the LVVWD and the cities of Henderson, Boulder City, Las Vegas, and North
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Las Vegas, would have veto power over any proposed policy direction, though the two
wastewater agencies, including the Big Bend Water District and the Clark County Water
Reclamation District, would not. The Reclamation District was involved because water
treatment was a central component of local water management. Under the new system,
each city or district shared water supplies, while maintaining their individual autonomy to
allocate water and shape policy. Each ran its own utilities, but infrastructure,
conservation and planning issues would be implemented on a regional scale and were the
responsibility of the new umbrella organization – the Southern Nevada Water Authority.
Nevada Governor Bob Miller lobbied the state legislature in support of the SNWA.
From his position in Carson City, he could see how a regional water authority would help
the state’s economy as a whole. In July 1991, Nevada Attorney General Frankie Sue Del
Papa signed the law to establish the SNWA.66 The state granted member agencies the
authority to create a cooperative organization under the powers of Nevada Revised
Statute (NRS) 277, a law the legislature created during the 1950s to allow local
governments to enter into cooperative agreements. Mulroy acknowledged that “[t]he
whole concept that we would throw away our water rights, that nobody had a priority
over anybody else and that we were going to be in this together,” was revolutionary for
water policy in the West.67 “This is a very monumental occasion,” The Las Vegas
Review Journal quoted Donnelly at the time, “What we accomplished here a number of
Western town and cities have tried and not been able to do.”68
Within a year of its founding, there was a major shake-up of SNWA’s staff. Mulroy,
the District general manager, replaced the SNWA’s first general manager Walter Fite,
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who had been recruited from the USBR. The SNWA member agencies had lost
confidence in Fite who approached water politics with a divide and conquer attitude. He
was “playing the purveyors against each other” noted David Donnelly, and “this ran
counter to the spirit of the SNWA.”69 Julie Wilcox, SNWA Head of Government
Services, ran the recruitment effort to replace Fite. Wilcox recalled, “that the quality of
the people who applied for the position never exceeded that of Mulroy.”70 Despite some
reluctance on the part of the member agencies, they eventually recognized the merit of
Mulroy’s qualifications and collectively appointed her SNWA District Manager in
January 1993.71 The newly formed SNWA hired additional staff including a deputy
general manager, chief engineer, and an office manager to handle clerical duties.
Another critical change was the decision among the member agencies to allow the
LVVWD to manage the SNWA’s operations. Despite some initial misgivings, the
member agencies conceded that since the district covered seventy-five percent of the
SNWA’s operating expenses and was the largest provider, it was in the best position to
assume a lead role in the SNWA.72 To ensure the SNWA member agencies satisfaction
with LVVWD leadership, they (the member agencies) would annually vote whether to
reaffirm the contract granting the District authority. Eventually the member agencies
stipulated that the contract granting Mulroy and the District leadership authority could be
cancelled if she left, a provision that expressed increased confidence in her leadership.73
One of Mulroy’s first actions as head of the SNWA was to sign a contract with the
USBR to acquire more Colorado River water and to administratively streamline the
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process of water delivery to the region. The USBR began to distribute water to one
entity—the SNWA—instead of dividing it among all of the LVMA’s various
municipalities. Simply put, the SNWA began to serve as an efficient medium though
which the USBR provided water to southern Nevada.
The agreement with the USBR also allowed the SNWA to access the remaining
58,000 of Nevada’s original 300,000 acre-feet per year allotment and to begin using
return-flow credits. To put SNWA’s request for additional water in perspective, in the
same year, California sought a temporary increase of its annual allotment from 4.4 MAF
to 5.2 MAF.74 Nevada did not need its full allotment until the late twentieth century,
when Las Vegas’s growth, coupled with a drought, made it necessary to come up with
alternate means of supplying the state with water. A few Nevada citizens groups feared
that the SNWA’s request was part of an effort by Las Vegas to seize more water from
rural areas of the state.75 So while the creation of the SNWA eased certain tensions and
facilitated more environmentally responsible practices, it did not alleviate all conflicts
over water.
The return-flow system provided a much-needed inflow of water to the region. As
previously noted, the return-flow system allows basin states to take more water than their
allotment, as long as they treat and return to the river any amount that exceeds their legal
allotment. For example, if Nevada withdrew 400,000 acre-feet of water from Lake Mead
and returned 100,000 acre-feet of treated water, then it remained at its 300,000 annual
limit. To obtain the additional annual supply of water, the SNWA had to build a new
intake pipe, or second “straw,” into Lake Mead. This new intake pipe was built alongside
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the existing one, but it extended to a greater depth. The pipeline took eight years to
complete at a cost of $80.9 million.76 At the same time, the SNWA also instituted public
education programs to encourage wise-use practices and discourage waste, as chapter
four will fully discuss.
The immediate effect of the 1992 USBR contract was the lifting of the yearlong
construction moratorium that had kept development in the Las Vegas Valley at a
standstill since the “St. Valentine’s Day Massacre” of 1991. The infusion of water and
plans for a pipeline allowed the District to resume granting water rights to contractors,
providing an immediate boost to the local economy. As the Las Vegas Review-Journal
noted, it “created jobs, [and] put people back to work.”77
Ironically, the additional water helped fuel a drive towards organizational and water
use efficiency. After the moratorium, the District kept much tighter reins on developers’
use of water than in the past. The District wanted to stop the water speculations that were
so prevalent under the previous will-service practice. Up until the 1990s, the county
simply handed over water rights to developers, whether or not they had any plans or
money in place to support their construction projects. Under the new plan, developers
had to demonstrate a significant financial commitment to their building projects before
receiving water rights. Dick Wimmer, SNWA Deputy General Manager, remembers that
“we ended up with a new process where [water] was not committed out in
advance…Developers had to understand that you do not get water until you have bonded
for everything, you have paid your connection fees [and] you are past the point of no
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return financially.”78 By providing much stronger safeguards against developers making
empty water commitments, the SNWA kept better track of its water supply and,
therefore, better managed its water resources.
A dramatic example of this change in policy occurred when Steve Wynn built
Treasure Island next to the Mirage in the 1990s. One of the premier developers in Las
Vegas during the mega-resort era, Wynn has been legendary for his attention to detail and
for the demands he placed upon his contractors and public officials. As he was about to
begin his new resort project, Wynn sought a water commitment. Wimmer remembers
that “we told him no, that is not how it works.”79 Despite the more stringent water
policy, Wynn proceeded with construction. Wimmer went on to say “he actually came
out of the ground without a water commitment,” which was testimony to both Wynn’s
investment in the community and the changing nature of water management in the
Valley.
Forecasting development and trying to allocate water equitably throughout the Valley
proved to be more problematic than anticipated. The city was growing at unexpected
rates and in areas not predicted by the WRMI planners. Despite formal commitments to
cooperate, individual water purveyors were still coveted their allocations. Some were
short on water, while others had more than enough. The SNWA soon recognized that the
current water distribution system was woefully inadequate. The SNWA wanted
something different for the Valley, something more flexible and dynamic.
In an unprecedented move, the SNWA decided to completely dismantle its
distribution system. It stopped administering water based on set percentages for each
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purveyor, and began sending water to where it was needed most. The purveyors
abandoned the concept of separate and individual water rights, and replaced it with the
idea of a single pot to be shared among them. Water allocation was no longer driven by
formulas. Instead, the SNWA delivered water based on need through a water budget
process that was annually revised. As Donnelly recalls, “[purveyor members basically
felt] let’s just forget that [meaning the WRMI allotments], and let the capacity go where
it’s needed.”80 The SNWA had renegotiated the cooperative agreement and thereby
produced a paradigm shift in western water management.
“The reason it is so profound,” explained Donnelly, “is because the seven members of
the SNWA—Henderson, N. Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Clark County Water Reclamation
District, Big Bend, Boulder City, and LVVWD—relinquished control of their water
rights to an overarching super-agency and allowed it to distribute water to areas not
necessarily their own. This is unheard of in the West, to surrender, in essence, one’s
water rights for the good of the whole.” In the words of Julie Wilcox, SNWA Public
Services Director, “This type of thing just doesn’t happen.”81
Wilcox’s statement partly reflects the historic legacy of water conflict in the West.
The region’s history is rife with examples of bitter disputes over water within and
between states, and between the United States and adjacent nations. For example,
citizens of northern and southern California have a longstanding animosity over each
others’ claims to the state’s water supplies, the states of Colorado and Wyoming have
taken their grievances over water rights all the way to the Supreme Court, and Mexico
has threatened to denounce the US in the United Nations and demand a hearing because
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of its pollution of the Colorado River.82 Considering this history, the formation of the
SNWA stands as a truly significant event – a profound shift in water management.
Extraordinary growth, limited water resources, and innovative minds all contributed
to the creation of the SNWA in 1991. By bringing together all the water utilities in the
LVMA and pooling their water supplies, SNWA began a new chapter in the history of
western water use. Instead of pitting different interests against each other and wasting
water in the process, the SNWA built a united cooperative, which facilitated conservation
and wise-use practices at the same time that it supported local development. The
SNWA’s flexibility and dynamism during the early years of its tenure empowered it to
meet the changing demands of the region.
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CHAPTER 4

PARTNERSHIP AND REGIONAL WATER ACQUISITION
Like mountains everywhere, the Spring Mountains that border Las Vegas’ western
edge are water makers. The streams and snow packs at the top of the peaks seep down
over ten thousand feet into the gravel and clay beds that underlie the Las Vegas Valley.
Some of this water finds its way into the homes of the Valley’s residents, then into the
Las Vegas Wash and eventually into the Colorado River. Rising high above Las Vegas,
Mt. Charleston affords a panoramic view of how water interconnects the region’s natural
ecosystems and cultural institutions.
Looking north from the peak past the Nevada Test Site, one sees into the heart of the
Great Basin and the expanse of mountain ranges that send scarce water into the areas
below. To the east, Hoover Dam impounds the Colorado River fresh from its descent
through the spectacular Grand Canyon of Arizona into Lake Mead, the largest reservoir
in America. Following its brief pause in the lake, the river continues through the dam
and turns southward flowing to California and finally Mexico. To the south, the Mojave
Desert stretches uninterrupted until it reaches the 11,000-foot escarpment of the San
Bernardino and San Gabriel mountains, on the other side of which lies the Los Angeles
Basin with its milder and wetter coastal climate. Westward, the rugged spine of the
Sierra Nevada forms a barrier blocking the coastal moisture from the Pacific, to produce
an arid Death Valley – the driest and lowest spot in North America.
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The territory encompassed by the Mount Charleston vantage point is as physically
vast as it is geographically, culturally, and economically diverse. Yet, it is utterly
interconnected by water – both as a feature of the natural ecology and as a facet of its
regional politics. While conflict over water has been common throughout the region’s
history, the SNWA has instead embraced a cooperative model of water management and
its initiatives have been predicated on the ecological and political interconnectedness of
the region’s water supplies. The SNWA has worked to create an integrated system, with
the understanding that use in one area would invariably affect use elsewhere, and that
conflict among water users only serves to divide communities and decrease the available
water supply. This new cooperative ethos has not only helped guide the SNWA in
regional and local matters, but has also made it a model among water agencies
worldwide. It is important to recognize, however, that the SNWA has not acted alone.
This chapter will examine the partnerships that the SNWA has forged in order to increase
the region’s water supply and to develop more integrated and sustainable water
management systems.
After the SNWA negotiated with the federal government to gain greater authority
over regional water management and to access Nevada’s full 300,000 acre-foot allotment
of the Colorado River through the 1992 Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) contract, it
sought to re-configure the Colorado River Commission (CRC) of Nevada.83 The SNWA
wanted the CRC to better reflect the interests of the southern part of the state, where most
of the water was being used. As noted in chapter one, the state legislature established the
Commission in 1935 to protect Nevada’s Colorado River interests, including the
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allotment of water and hydroelectric power. The CRC was comprised of seven
gubernatorial appointees chosen from locations throughout the state. The problem with
this arrangement was that representatives from the northern part of the state, which did
not have access to the Colorado River, had proprietary rights to a resource that was
beyond their reach. This occurred because in the years before court-mandated
reapportionment, each county (most were in the north) had one state senator; it was not
yet based on population.
One of the SNWA’s first priorities was to transform the CRC board so that it more
fully represented southern Nevadans. In 1993, Patricia Mulroy petitioned then governor
of Nevada Bob Miller (of Las Vegas) and the state legislature (reapportioned in 1965 to
give Clark County control of both legislative houses), to allow the SNWA to appoint
three out of the seven seats on the Commission. Under the new arrangement, the
governor would appoint the remaining four positions, including the chair. When the
measure passed in 1993, this administrative re-organization shifted power to the region
that would be most directly impacted by the CRC’s decisions. As Mulroy described it,
“We were paying 100 percent of the bill for the Commission and had no voice…This
allowed Nevada to speak as one voice.”84
Although Governor Miller and U.S. Senator Harry Reid backed the CRC’s reconfiguration, a few state lawmakers feared that greater integration of the SNWA and the
Commission would create a governmental organization with potentially too much power.
Nevada State Assemblyman Hal Smith (R-Henderson) called the partnership a “power
grab,” and Assemblywoman Marcia De Bragga (D-Fallon) argued that at least one
representative from northern Nevada should be on the Commission. She felt that it was a
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conflict of interest to give the SNWA representation on the CRC, since the SNWA had
plans to acquire northern Nevada water.85 After considering these opposing viewpoints,
the Nevada legislature still decided in favor of the plan and granted the SNWA the power
to appoint three of the seven members to the CRC.
An important intermediary in the SNWA’s negotiations with the federal government
and neighboring states was Interior Secretary (1993-2001) Bruce Babbitt. A former
governor of Arizona, attorney for northern Nevada’s White Pine County ranchers, and a
close affiliate of Mulroy’s during his tenure as Secretary of Interior, Babbitt was quite
familiar with the challenges facing the Southwest. During the 1990s, he was instrumental
in fostering cooperation and compromise among the Colorado River Basin states, and
helped make the Compact more malleable and elastic, so that it could meet the states’
changing demographics and needs.
With the CRC’s support and Secretary Babbitt’s assistance, the SNWA and its
neighboring lower basin states pursued stronger partnerships. Indeed, the Interim Surplus
Criteria Agreement of 2001 demonstrated a major breakthrough in inter-state
cooperation, showing how different states could work within the parameters of the
Colorado River Compact, while still accommodating each other’s needs. The Agreement
gave the Secretary of Interior the authority to declare a “surplus” of water on the
Colorado River to be allotted to the states on a temporary basis. As noted, the upper
basin states had historically been unable to use their entire water allotments, which then
flowed downstream. Ever since 1922, California had exploited this situation by taking
and withdrawing all of this unclaimed water. The state routinely exceeded its 4.4 MAFY
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allotment, sometimes by as much as 800,000 acre-feet.86 California’s actions caused
serious concern among the upper basin states, especially since they were beginning to
face their own growth issues. In short, they feared that California’s elevated water
withdrawal levels would become institutionalized policy.
The Interim Surplus Criteria Agreement is a two-part plan that addressed both the
upper basin’s fears and California’s needs. In the first part of the plan, the upper river
basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Utah joined together with the
lower basin states of Arizona and Nevada and agreed to designate the unclaimed portions
of river water that states did not use as “surplus,” which they then permitted California to
draw on for up to ten years. The Interim Agreement, therefore, gave California a grace
period in which to lower its intake rather than demanding that it immediately reduce the
amount of water it withdrew from Lake Mead.
The other states were amenable to this approach because California promised to
initiate a conservation program and cut its water use by 800,000 AFY by the year 2016.
This second component of the Interim Surplus Agreement is known as the Colorado
River Water Use Plan. California water managers hoped to conserve an initial 459,000
AFY by lining canals with impermeable materials to plug leaks, storing water
underground in aquifers, forcing urban and rural communities within the state to share
aqueducts, and leaving agricultural fields fallow.87 The two plans (Interim Surplus
Criteria Agreement and Colorado River Conservation Plan) worked in tandem, since the
former allowed California to gradually reduce the amount of water it withdrew from Lake
Mead, while the latter provided them with the tools to enable them to do just that.
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Because of a prolonged drought that began in 2002, California could not reduce its
intake of Colorado River water and therefore implement the Interim Surplus Agreement
and the Colorado River Conservation Plan. As an alternative, the SNWA helped devise
other collective solutions to maximize efficient use of the Colorado River among the
Compact states. The SNWA and other purveyors diversified available water assets by
developing a greater number and variety of methods for acquiring and managing water.
One of these methods was the water banking system.
Babbitt initiated the banking system when he facilitated a groundwater storage
program as governor of Arizona in the 1970s and 1980s. The Arizona Banking
Agreement of 2004 between Nevada and Arizona was the first example of an interstate
storage system.88 The banking system involves storing or “banking” unused annual water
allotment from the Colorado River in underground storage units (such as aquifers) instead
of letting the unused water flow downstream. Prior to this agreement, Colorado River
basin water purveyors could not store water for future use, because tributaries along the
river counted as part of the overall flow and so they could not store waters from these
sources either. With the agreement, however, lower basin states were permitted to store
water in “off-stream” sites. In other words, they could not store it in Colorado River
reservoirs, such as Lake Mead, but they could use other storage alternatives, such as
aquifers and off-stream reservoirs.
The SNWA and the state of Arizona had begun negotiating what became the Arizona
Water Banking Agreement in 2001. Southern Nevada was looking for other ways to
meet its water demands, and Arizona had more water than it needed. Arizona was also
motivated by the desire to protect and maintain its original CRC water allotment.
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Arizona water managers feared that California or another state would ask them to forfeit
a portion of their allotment because of under utilization. Under the agreement, Arizona
contracted to sell Nevada 1.25 MAF (more than 400 billion gallons of water) of its
unused allotment for $330 million. Nevada could not withdraw Arizona’s unused
allotment all at once, but would have to withdraw a portion annually beginning with
20,000 AFY in 2007 and rising to as high as 40,000 AFY by 2011.89 Nevada paid to
store the water in Arizona’s aquifer, since it was for Nevada’s future use. If, however,
Arizona had to use its entire allotment during any given year, Nevada had to defer to
those needs. The banking system provided great benefits to both parties. Nevada was
able to secure additional water for the future while Arizona was able to make a profit
while at the same time maintaining a claim on its allotment of the Colorado River.
The Arizona Banking Agreement had strong support among the lower basin states
because the states worked out a mutually beneficial compromise rather than getting mired
in conflict. According to Herb Guenther, Director of the Arizona Department of Water
Resources, “We will continue to have some water in excess of what we would be able to
put to beneficial use. As long as we have that water and it can be put to beneficial use by
another state in the basin, we have the right to store that water on their behalf in exchange
for compensation.”90 Rather than engaging in a legal battle over Arizona’s unused water,
the SNWA and Arizona instead worked together to develop an innovative water sharing
system. By building this alliance, they not only strengthened the ties among western
water users, but also protected their own water interests. As the Arizona Water Resource
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newsletter reported, many celebrated the banking agreement as a “big breakthrough” in
western water management.91
The Arizona Water Banking Agreement of 2004 established a precedent for future
banking deals. Shortly after it was completed, the SNWA negotiated a similar deal with
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET), in which Nevada would
bank its unused water allotment in Los Angeles basin aquifers and reservoirs. As a result
of numerous conservation measures, between 2003 and 2007, Nevada used less water
than its annual allotment of 300,000 acre-feet. In keeping with the rules established
under the Arizona Banking Agreement, it was free to store or sell any unused portion of
its yearly allotment.
The California Banking Agreement was another mutually beneficial arrangement.
For Nevada, it provided a future source of water that it could use to support southern
Nevada’s growth. For California, it provided a small amount of water to help alleviate
immediate water shortages in the southern part of the state. It is important to note that the
SNWA could have pumped this unused water into the Southern Nevada Water Bank, an
aquifer underlying the Las Vegas Valley. Yet, in the spirit of cooperation the SNWA, the
MET, and the USBR worked together to create a deal that benefited both states. In the
words of Mulroy, the California Water Bank “helps establish the spirit of cooperation that
we’re going to so desperately need on the Colorado as the drought continues.”92
Besides working towards more sustainable water consumption methods and more
efficient and cooperative management systems, the SNWA also joined with others to
improve the region’s environmental.

Environmental advocates first brought news of the
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Colorado’s ecological destruction during the 1950s, but it was only in 2001 that the
Colorado River Basin states created a regional conservation program. That year, the
endangerment of three species of tiny fish—the razorback sucker, the bonytail chub, and
the Colorado squawfish—and subsequent pressure from environmental advocacy groups
like the Defenders of Wildlife and the Southwest Biological Center for Biodiversity,
spurred the SNWA, California, Arizona, the federal government, to create a plan to save
them.93
The banks along the lower Colorado River have long supported a vast array of
wildlife. Hundreds of bird species, including the Western Least Bittern, the California
Black Rail, the Yellow Billed Cuckoo, and even the occasional bald eagle have depended
on the lower Colorado River habitat. The delta that forms where the Colorado River
empties into the Gulf of California was at one time one of the most ecologically diverse
environments in North America, and home to the Yuma Clapper Rail (a long beaked
marsh bird), the Vaquita Porpoise, and the Totaoaba fish. The USBR’s construction of
dams along the Colorado during the twentieth century adversely affected this ecosystem.
The dams provided water and electricity to the region’s expanding populations and
industries, but they also endangered the animals and plants living in the Colorado River
watershed.
Americans initially celebrated these dams as signs of progress, and enthusiastically
greeted each new project. But attitudes began to change in the 1960s and 1970s as many
concerned citizens developed a new environmental awareness and questioned this
wholehearted faith in the benefits of progress. Widespread concerns about pollution,
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endangered wildlife populations, and diminished open spaces spurred people to action.
As a part of a larger effort to improve the health of America’s rivers, numerous citizens
and conservation groups like the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society sought to
rehabilitate the Colorado River ecosystem.
Arguably the most famous example of environmental activism to protect a river
occurred during the 1950s when the USBR announced plans to build a dam on the Green
River that would flood portions of Dinosaur National Monument, a unit of the National
Park System that straddles the Utah/Colorado border. The Green River is a part of the
Colorado River System and converges with the mainstream in central Utah
approximately two hundred miles south of the monument. The Sierra Club under David
Brower as well as the Wilderness Society led the attack against the Echo Park Dam,
recruiting thousands of private citizens to the cause. These individuals lobbied their
senators and representatives to such a degree that Congress eventually abandoned support
for the USBR plan. But this success came at a cost. Advocates had limited legal and
financial resources with which to oppose the USBR and were unable to mount a similar
undertaking against a second dam planned for Glen Canyon in Southern Utah/Northern
Arizona. Although this dam would not affect any national parks, Brower, nevertheless,
came to regret his decision to essentially sacrifice Glen Canyon to preserve Echo Park.
His motivation and the subsequent public lament for the loss of Glen Canyon, coupled
with the burgeoning environmental movement of the 1960s, created an environmental
constituency that has helped prevent the construction of any dams on the Colorado River
since 1963. The initial effort to protect Echo Park helped establish a legacy of
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environmental activism within the Colorado River Basin that persists into the twenty-first
century.94
This legacy, in part, influenced the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
in 1994 to list large portions of the Colorado River, including Lake Powell, Lake Mead,
Lake Mohave, and Lake Havasu, as vital habitat for the three species of endangered fish.
In addition, the following year, Nevada, Arizona, and California and the U.S. Department
of the Interior signed the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, a
50-year wildlife protection plan. The program had to balance the competing desires of
urban, recreational, environmental, and agricultural interests, not to mention the needs of
the animals themselves. The program’s goals were the rehabilitation and conservation of
riparian habitat, the recovery and protection of threatened native species, and compliance
with federal and California endangered species laws. At the same time, it sought to
maintain water diversions for agriculture and urban users and the hydroelectric power
generated by the river’s numerous dams.
Critics argued that the Multi-Species program, along with the Interim Surplus
Guidelines and the banking systems, did not reserve enough water for ecosystems along
the river and its delta.95 Despite these shortcomings, it was nonetheless a major political
accomplishment in terms of bringing together diverse constituencies for the cause of
environmental protection. In the words of SNWA spokesperson Kay Brothers, “ the fact
that the agencies from three states and the federal government can agree on the
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environmental programs was significant…this is something that is a huge example of
what you can do when you cooperate. It’s really a huge success for the lower basin
entities that did this.”96
At the same time that the SNWA was developing stronger partnerships with its
neighbors, it also pursued them within the state. Besides creating regional acquisition
programs through the California and Arizona water banks, the SNWA also looked within
Nevada for additional water sources to diversify its water stores. One advantage of using
in-state sources was that it significantly decreased the chances of federal and interstate
opposition. The SNWA sought water in ever-expanding concentric circles from local
rivers near the Las Vegas Valley to underground aquifers in the state’s northeastern
regions.
The Virgin River northeast of Las Vegas was the first regional source the SNWA
added to its Colorado River supplies. Even though the Virgin River heads in
Southeastern Utah near Zion National Park, it can be considered a Nevada resource since
the state has a prior claim to the river that predates the 1922 Colorado River Compact.
Despite its small size, the river created Zion Canyon, a chasm several thousand feet deep.
The river then descends from Utah’s plateaus to the lower Mojave Desert, traveling
through the northwestern tip of Arizona and finally into Nevada and Lake Mead. Despite
its modest size, during the early 1990s the SNWA aggressively sought to add this
waterway to its collection of water reserves.
The Nevada State Water Engineer (State Engineer) granted the SNWA rights to the
Virgin River in 1994. The State Engineer works for the Division of Water Resources,
which was established by two legislative acts, in 1913 and 1939. Through the Division
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of Water Resources, the State Engineer has the ultimate authority over all water in the
Nevada. The State Engineer granted the SNWA rights to the Virgin River based on the
state’s rights to the river that predated the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.97 Even though the State Engineer gave his official
sanction to use the river, the SNWA’s plan to allow the river to flow into Lake Mead and
withdraw a corresponding amount downstream drew the attention of the federal officials
and other basin states.
Following a practice known as “water-wheeling,” the SNWA planned to let the
Virgin River flow its usual course into Lake Mead and then withdraw a corresponding
amount of water downstream at the Saddle Island intake point. This required support
from the other basin states, since it was technically illegal under the Colorado River
Compact. Under the agreement, all water that reaches the main stem of the Colorado
River becomes common property of the basin states. Its tributaries, with the exception of
the Salt and Gila Rivers of Arizona, are considered part and parcel of the main waterway
and are not available for unilateral exploitation, as earlier noted. Consequently, according
to existing law, the SNWA would not be able to claim the Virgin River contributions as
its own after that stream joined the Colorado River.
As an alternative to accessing the Virgin River waters from Lake Mead, the Authority
considered constructing a dam and pipeline from the mouth of the Virgin River directly
to the LVMA. This method had two major drawbacks. In the first place, a dam would
flood riparian habitat that was vital to several species of fish and waterfowl. Secondly,
the monetary cost would be enormous, with some estimates for the system running as
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high as $500 million.98 The SNWA was able to avoid the environmentally and monetarily
costly pipeline when, in 2006, the USBR and the other basin states permitted the
Authority to obtain Virgin River waters via the water wheeling system. It would only be
allowed to withdraw ninety-seven percent of the river flow, however, because three
percent would have to be withheld to account for water lost due to evaporation. Even
though it had official sanction, the SNWA did not develop its Virgin River rights. As a
result of the drought with the Colorado River Basin, the SNWA agreed to forgo utilizing
the Virgin River in the short-term in order to maintain the water flow into Lake Mead and
prevent further decline of its water levels. The SNWA entered this agreement with the
understanding that it would develop the Virgin River at some point in the future if and
when more favorable environmental conditions return to the Colorado River Basin. As
part of the agreement the SNWA decided to instead pursue its other instate water sources.
The Muddy River was the next water resource that the SNWA sought to develop.
The Muddy River emanates from springs deep within the Arrow Mountains fifty miles
northeast of Las Vegas. Local residents had primarily used the river for agricultural
purposes since the time of the Anasazi Indians over twelve hundred years ago. In 1997,
the State Engineer set a new precedent when he granted the SNWA permission to use it
for urban, rather than for agricultural, development. Once the SNWA had secured the
rights to use the Muddy River waters, it then had to create a feasible means of bringing
the water to Las Vegas, something that would surely initiate conflict between local
residents and the SNWA. Instead of fighting for the water in court, as has been the
historically common approach, the SNWA purchased water rights from the farmers who
owned them. When the SNWA purchased water rights directly from farmers it saved
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both time and money, and arguably avoided the provocation of rural animosity toward
Las Vegas and the SNWA.
The SNWA board voted unanimously to authorize the purchase of water rights for
5,200 AFY of Muddy River water at a cost of $10.9 million in 1999.99 The SNWA was
ultimately able to access 7,000 AFY from the Muddy River by purchasing additional
shares from the Muddy Valley Irrigation Company between 1997 and 2005.100 Because
of the Muddy River’s proximity to the Virgin River, the SNWA simply consolidated this
additional water into the existing water-wheeling plan. While the SNWA has begun to
use water from the Muddy River, it has yet to access water from the Virgin River.
The SNWA’s plans for the Virgin and Muddy rivers prompted several groups,
including the National Park Service, Moapa Band of Paiutes, residents of rural Nevada
communities, and the incorporated towns of Mesquite and Bunkerville (located fifty
miles northeast of Las Vegas) to lodge complaints with the State Engineer. Their protests
primarily resulted from a concern over the pipeline’s potential negative environmental
impact. Once the SNWA received permission to let tributary waters flow into its intake
pump-station on the Colorado River it abandoned the pipeline plan, at which point the
opposition dissolved and few protesters appeared at the public hearings.101
In perhaps the most controversial move of SNWA’s existence, the agency sought the
right to pump groundwater from three rural and distant Nevada counties. A vast network
of aquifers lies northeast of Las Vegas in upper Clark County, Nye, Lincoln, and White
Pine Counties. The porous limestone underlying the region has produced hollowed-out
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pits that store enormous amounts of water that has seeped down from the surrounding
mountain ranges. The state of Nevada has been aware of this store of subterranean water
as a potential source for the LVMA since at least the 1960s. When the Department of
Defense began exploring the possibility of locating MX nuclear-missile silos in the
mountain valleys of northern Nevada in the 1970s and 1980s, the underground reservoirs
gained attention again. While the Defense Department abandoned its plans, the District
and the SNWA campaigned to acquire this vast resource, a venture known as the In-State
Groundwater Project (ISGP).
A decision by the basin states helped compel southern Nevada’s water managers to
pursue rights to the northern aquifers. In 1989, as head of the District, Mulroy proposed
to the upper basin states that Nevada buy a portion of their agricultural rights to the
Colorado River. The state managers quickly rebuffed her request. They told her that
Nevada had to develop its own in-state water resources before they would consider any
changes to the Colorado River allotments. As a result, the District turned to the northern
aquifers.
The Groundwater Project began in 1989 when the District applied for 147 permits to
develop well water in White Pine, Lincoln, and northern Clark counties. The sheer
number of applications from the Las Vegas purveyor sent shock waves through much of
rural northern Nevada, and protesters filed over 3,600 complaints with the State
Engineer.102 Because of this immediate and vocal opposition, the District decided to put
the Project on hold for several years. But in 2004, under pressure from a severe drought,
the SNWA, once again pursued the Project albeit in a more restrained manner. This time

102

Henry Brean, “Pipeline Plans, Water Rights to be Argued,” Las Vegas Review Journal, March 22,
2004.

73

it filed only seven groundwater withdrawal applications with the State Engineer, instead
of 147. The seven sites the SNWA applied for were located in six valleys north of Las
Vegas: Coyote Springs, Delamar, Dry Lake, Cave, Spring, and Snake Valleys. These
areas are sparsely populated and are primarily used for ranchland.
SNWA officials knew that tapping into these northern Nevada underground reservoirs
would greatly reduce Las Vegas’s reliance on the Colorado River, which currently
supplies around ninety percent of the local water needs.103 The SNWA position is that it
considers the northeastern Nevada groundwater as a sustainable long-term source of
water and not a temporary stopgap measure. According to J.C. Davis, Senior Public
Information Coordinator of the SNWA, “The rights for which the SNWA has applied are
considered a permanent renewable resource.” 104 The SNWA will deliver the 125,000 to
200,000 acre-feet of water per year that it plans to withdraw from northern Nevada to Las
Vegas through a pipeline. The scope of this project is ambitious, requiring the
construction of more than 450 miles of pipeline (all below ground), 200 miles of power
lines, and four pumping stations for a combined estimated cost of over two billion
dollars.
The State Engineer ruled first on the Spring Valley intake site in 2008, when it
granted the SNWA permission to withdraw up to 60,000 acre-feet annually from the
aquifer. The SNWA received rights to immediately withdraw 40,000 acre-feet per year
of water from the Spring Valley well, with permission for the remaining 20,000 acre-feet
per year pending a comprehensive study of the possible environmental impacts. In
addition, the State Engineer also granted SNWA rights to 18,755 acre-feet of water from
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Cave, Delamar, and Dry Lake Valleys.105 While these rulings alarmed many residents of
the northern counties, as well as southern Nevada environmentalists, the SNWA
attempted to reassure the public that it was following every safeguard to ensure the
environmental health of the region. As SNWA spokesperson J.C. Davis announced, “For
the Environmental Impact Study, we are studying everything you can possibly
imagine...Not just hydrology, but baseline studies of species within the proposed
pumping area, vegetation densities and composition, air quality, etc. When I say finetooth comb, I mean it. They are inventorying every bug, bunny and bristlecone in the
region.”106 Despite these assurances, many ranchers in northeastern Nevada as well as
individuals within the Las Vegas metropolitan expressed reservations about the logic
supporting Las Vegas’ ambition.
Considering the magnitude of the ISGP, it is not surprising that it has inspired some
opposition in northern Nevada communities. Spring Valley ranchers have expressed
serious concerns about the effects that draining the aquifer will have on their agricultural
enterprises. They worry that pumping the aquifer will draw down the water table to the
point where they will not be able to access it for their livestock.107 Because the NevadaUtah state line bisects the valley, Utah state officials and ranchers are also concerned
about the pipeline’s depletion of local water supplies, especially because of the growing
population along the Wasatch Front. Rancher Cecil Garland of Callao, Utah expressed
misgivings about the SNWA plan to pump water from the region, and described it as a
contest between “crops vs. craps.” For Garland it is a moral issue as he argues that he is
earning an honest living off the land and it is wrong for a distant city like Las Vegas to
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invade his valley and potentially destroy his livelihood. Notes Garland, “Gluttony, glitter,
girls, and gambling are what [Las Vegas] is all about…What it’s all about here is
children, cattle, country and church.” 108 The fear amongst politicians and ranchers is that
the aquifers cannot withstand pumping and supply sufficient water to sustain the natural
environment and the local economy at the same time.
One of the main criticisms of the ISGP is that Las Vegas is reaching beyond its
watershed for resources. Critics fear the SNWA is going to repeat the now infamous Los
Angeles Owens Valley water grab of 1913, an event in which the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (LADWP) drained rural Owens Valley of water with
devastating effects on the region. To be sure, there are several similarities between the
two situations. Like Los Angeles, Las Vegas is a large urban center seeking water in
rural areas outside its borders. Both are boomtowns. Until early 2009, growth in southern
Nevada was as rampant as it was in southern California during the early twentieth
century. From 1900 to 1930, when Los Angeles began to seek outside water sources, the
population soared from 170,000 to over 2.2 million, a figure only slightly greater than the
LVMA’s growth at the close of the twentieth century.109
There are significant contrasts between the two cities, however. The LADWP showed
little or no concern for the environmental fate of the Owens Valley. In what was proved
an environmentally destructive move, Los Angeles tapped the entire flow of the Owens
River and diverted it into concrete aqueducts to convey water to Los Angeles. Even
though city leaders worked with state and federal officials, no one ever set limits on the
amount of water the LADWP could withdraw. After the water diversion to Los Angeles,
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Owens Valley’s once rich farmland was incapable of supporting agriculture. Publicly
acknowledging the mistakes of the past, the SNWA has declared it would take a different
approach in northern Nevada.
Unlike the LADWP, the SNWA will fulfill several legal requirements before
pumping any water from northern Nevada. First, it must apply to the State Engineer for a
permit to develop groundwater. (This is what it succeeded in doing at Spring Valley in
2008.) Before granting any water rights, the State Engineer must consider existing
claims, proof of beneficial use, and whether or not use of the water is detrimental to the
public good. The State Engineer grants water rights according to Nevada state water law,
which is predicated upon the key principles of prior appropriation and beneficial use.
Prior appropriation, also known as “first in time, first in right,” as previously stated, gives
priority to the party that has used the water source the longest. “Beneficial use” means
that the party that owns the right to the water must use it productively; examples of it are
wide ranging and include recreation, industry, municipal services, mining, and
agriculture.110 The State Engineer takes into account several factors from many
constituencies across the state before ruling on a case.
The SNWA asserts that there are other significant differences between the two
historical events. To begin with, the SNWA has stated that it applied for only a portion of
the water available in the aquifers, whereas Los Angeles appropriated the entire Owens
River. And, unlike the LADWP, the SNWA prides itself on its history of developing
programs since its inception to decrease consumption throughout the Las Vegas
metropolitan area. Some could also point out the media attention has been far more
scrutinizing of the SNWA plan than that of the LADWP’s in the early twentieth century
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and that the latter enjoyed a cozy relationship with local newspapers like the Los Angeles
Times to rally support for the Owens Valley Aqueduct and to downplay opposition. It
can be pointed out, however, that the SNWA has also had a rather positive relationship
with the pro-growth Las Vegas Review Journal. To be fair, the SNWA has been
comparatively open about its plans for northern Nevada water and has held numerous
public meetings with pipeline opponents. Many Owens Valley residents perceived the
LADWP as having essentially blocked interested parties from attending policy meetings
while at the same time that it actively courted the southern California public to support its
cause. The Los Angeles Times, a staunch supporter of the LADWP plans in the Owens
Valley, railed against those who opposed the Los Angeles aqueduct. In contrast, the
SNWA has provided a forum for the public to voice its opinions. Citizens have the right
to attend SNWA board meetings during which it can express various concerns. Indeed,
one of the pipeline’s leading opponents, Dean Baker, a White Pine County rancher, has
attended numerous meetings to voice his opposition to the SNWA’s plan.111
Despite the Authority’s insistence that the two historical events are not analogous,
that has not convinced White Pine Rancher Dean Baker. When asked what his thoughts
were in the matter he responded:
Owens Valley is a very good parallel to this. Southern Nevada Water
Authority hates that to be brought up, but you've got to realize that Owens Valley
is on the east side of the range that collects most of the moisture that comes off of
the Pacific. It is one of the best water sources there is in the West and by the time
it gets here to Snake Valley it has gone across a half a dozen or dozen other
ranges that rain more water out and drop it down. The history of Owens Valley
was that they didn't start in initially to dry the ranches up. They were only going
to take a little water and they weren't going to harm it, but as it became clear that
there was such a conflict, they just simply had no choice but to dry it up and suck
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it dry. They say the laws won't let them do that now, but I question that.112
Critics like Baker have repeatedly pointed out the potential environmental impact of the
SNWA pipeline, again comparing it to the Los Angeles Aqueduct’s effect in the Owens
Valley. While a common concern, it fails to adequately recognize the radically different
ethos governing environmental policy in the twenty-first century from when the L.A.
aqueduct was completed in 1913. There are significantly more environmental safeguards
now in place, including the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, The Clean
Air Act of 1970, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and the Clean Water Act of 1977.
The SNWA has repeatedly claimed to have openly and thoroughly adhered to these
environmental regulations, a statement that seems to withstand scrutiny in light of the
organization’s exhaustive environmental impact study of the proposed pipeline route.113
The SNWA turned to northern counties and local tributaries for water in order to
diversify its water resources so that it would not have to depend so heavily on the
Colorado River. While the SNWA’s actions have met with controversy, to be fair the
organization has attempted to work closely with ranchers in the rural counties of northern
Nevada to ensure that pumping water to Las Vegas will not adversely affect those making
their living off the land. The SNWA has spent significant funds on scientific research to
determine the potential environmental impacts of their actions. The SNWA’s position is
that it is attempting to mitigate environmental damage in northeastern Nevada in order to
preserve rural ways of life and biodiversity. It is the Authority’s intention to serve as a
model for sustainable water management in the American West by preserving both
environmental and cultural resources.

112
113

Desert Wars: Water and the West, http://www.kued.org/productions/desertwars/baker_dean.php.
http://www.snwa.com/html/system_gdp_bio_studies.html, accessed April 22, 2009.

79

CHAPTER 5

INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOCAL WATER USE
The Las Vegas metropolitan area has changed drastically over the past two decades.
Not only is the city twice as large as it was in 1990, but the casinos have grown to more
colossal heights, the suburbs have expanded into the foothills surrounding the valley, and
the freeways and roads have created an ever more complicated network of transportation
corridors. This rapid expansion of modern Las Vegas, both upward and outward,
overshadows a more subtle change to the metropolitan area’s makeup: throughout the
Valley water intensive lawns have largely been downsized or eliminated, giving way to
desert adapted plants and trees; decorative fountains now utilize recycled water, and the
ubiquitous swimming pool, summer refuge for young and old alike, is increasingly veiled
with plastic covers to decrease rates of evaporation. These changes have brought
dramatic results; to date, southern Nevadans have removed enough grass from their yards
to save the community almost six billion gallons of water a year, enough to form an
eighteen inch-wide strip of turf that stretches from Las Vegas to Australia.114 The
fountains that adorn businesses throughout the Valley are actually a symbol of
compromise that represents an enormous savings of water. The SNWA specifically
targeted fountains in its efforts to reduce consumption, but rather than mandating their
elimination, it allowed business owners to keep them if they reduced water consumption
in other areas, such as grass removal—and, the SNWA added, the water savings must
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equal fifty times that used by the fountains. The fountains stayed, and the grass was
removed. Lastly, simply by placing a plastic cover over their pools, residents saved
southern Nevada over forty-seven million gallons in one year alone.115 While these
measures save the LVMA an enormous amount of water annually, they only represent a
mere fraction of the overall SNWA conservation program, a campaign that affects every
level of southern Nevada life, from the frenetic social and economic activity of the Las
Vegas Strip to the quiet suburbs surrounding it.
While chapter three tells a regional story, in this section the emphasis is local and
outlines how southern Nevadans receive, use, and dispose of water within the Las Vegas
Valley. As the SNWA searched the region for additional water sources, it simultaneously
launched a plan to improve the infrastructure within the LVMA and initiated a
conservation campaign to decrease consumption. The Las Vegas metropolitan area’s
water system is a complex and highly integrated organization of pipes and pumping
stations, which in many ways resembles the circulatory system of the human body. In
southern Nevada this system takes water from Lake Mead, brings it to drinking standards
with two treatment plants, then sends it all around the Las Vegas Valley through a grid of
pipes, into homes and businesses where it is used and consumed, before delivering it back
to the Colorado River via sewage plants and the Las Vegas Wash. During its journey, the
water flows into myriad locations: from pools and parks, to homes and casinos; from
schools and government buildings, to apartments and car washes.
This system is comprised of three vital components: the water delivery infrastructure
of pipes and treatment plants, greatly expanded and modernized with the Capital
Improvements Program of 1995; the SNWA Water Smart Campaign, an institutionalized
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set of guidelines for water conservation covered within the SNWA Conservation Plan;
and the Las Vegas Wash, a system of marshes and wetlands which help purify and
dispose of the Valley’s water after it has been used. This chapter will outline each of
these subjects and expand upon how this urban water “circulatory system” works and
how nature, citizens, and the SNWA collaborate to efficiently and effectively execute its
operation.
Throughout southern Nevada’s history, the Las Vegas Valley’s water purveyors have
struggled to build an adequate infrastructure capable of delivering enough water to an
ever-expanding population. Growth has always outpaced the designer’s best efforts to
build an effective water delivery system. In 1954 planners for the Las Vegas Valley
Water District thought it had solved the shortage problems when the organization
acquired rights to the Las Vegas Springs and a small pipeline from Lake Mead, only to
find out that yet more was needed, leading to the construction of the Southern Nevada
Water System in 1971-84. The SNWS, a joint venture between the federal government
and the state of Nevada, expanded southern Nevada’s water conveyance capabilities and
consisted of an intake pipe from Lake Mead, as well as a water treatment plant. Engineers
expected this system to provide water for southern Nevada well into the twenty-first
century, but by the late 1980s it too proved unable to keep up with growth. The SNWA
assumed responsibility for the issue of adequate infrastructure following its creation in
1991. In 1994 the SNWA created an advisory committee, the Integrated Resource
Planning Advisory Committee (IRPAC), comprised of twenty-five members of the
southern Nevada community, whose purpose was to plan for the expansion of water
services in southern Nevada. These individuals, representing a wide range of socio-
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economic groups, including the Bank of America, AFL-CIO, Sierra Club, and the Clark
County School District, drafted a list of recommendations that became guideposts for the
construction of an enlarged urban water system, one that came to be known as the Capital
Improvements Program (CIP).116 The most pressing issue for the IRPAC was how to
finance the CIP. Water hookup fees had paid for water expansion construction until the
mid 1990s, but the IRPAC realized that the CIP would be a much larger expansion than
had occurred in southern Nevada previously, and that it would require additional sources
of money. After debating many options, the SNWA advisory committee recommended
an increased sales tax as a way to augment the regional hookup fees as a way to pay for
the CIP.
At first glance it may seem like the board chose a regressive method of funding.
Sales taxes have often been criticized as disproportionately impacting the poor, but there
is a logic to it that makes sense in southern Nevada. Many social scientists recommend
more progressive types of taxation, like those on income and property, however, in
southern Nevada the normal rules do not always apply. Supporters of the sales tax
pointed out that property and income taxes would only affect Nevadans, but that locals
and tourists alike would share a sales tax.117 Therefore, the reasoning went, in a city that
hosted forty million visitors a year, a sales tax was actually a progressive tax that spreads
the burden between tourists and residents. However, the sales tax only provided twenty
eight percent of the CIP’s overall cost. As a result, the SNWA had to rely on additional
sources of revenue, such as a regional connection charge (fifty seven percent), a
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reliability surcharge (five percent), and water rates (ten percent) to fully fund the CIP.118
The SNWA decided to implement the IRPAC sales tax recommendation and brought
the proposal to the Clark County Commission, a body that had the power to implement it.
Always a political hot-potato, and one year before the elections, the Commission decided
to place the issue before the voters themselves, a politically savvy move that enabled
them to sidestep the thorny issue of taxation—and perhaps not unwisely for the plan
encountered immediate community resistance. Opponents argued that the sales tax
would only benefit a choice few and that growth should be funded by developers, not
taxpayers. Chuck Muth of the Republican Liberty Party praised the Commission’s
decision to place the issue before the voters, noting that “the special interests still may
prevail on the tax hike, but they’re going to have to go to the voters instead of behind
closed doors.” Ken Mahal of the Nevada Seniors Coalition echoed this sentiment when
he stated “placing the issue on the ballot was a ‘fantastic loss’ for special interests.119
Even some state legislators expressed reservations, if not downright opposition, to the
plan. Assemblyman Harry Mortensen (D-Henderson) contended that growth provided
enough money through water rates and connection fees to cover the $2 billion price tag
for the construction of treatment plans and pipelines. However, Mortensen’s reasoning,
shared by many who opposed the plan, only “accounts for the revenue side of the
equation, not the on-going cost”; something columnist Jon Ralston of the Las Vegas
Review Journal pointed out.120 Mortensen only looked at what was needed to build new
infrastructure and failed to account for the continuing maintenance costs of an urban
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water system.
The resort and homebuilding industries were the most supportive of the sales tax
initiative, because they had most to gain financially from the measure. Homebuilders
could defray the cost of water hookups, which in turn helped keep the local housing
market strong. This helped promote the local economy, a factor beneficial to southern
Nevada casino owners since it improved Las Vegas’ overall image to tourists. The
southern Nevada homebuilders, resort industry, and the SNWA were all unhappy with the
Commission’s decision to place the tax initiative before voters.121 Bill Vasiliadis, who
represented the Nevada Resort Association, pressed the SNWA board and Clark County
Commission to pass the tax without the public’s vote. People like Vasiliadis felt it highly
unlikely that the voters of Southern Nevada would support a tax initiative—not an
unreasonable fear given the state’s historic antipathy towards taxes of all kinds.
Despite great uncertainty, the measure passed by a large margin of victory. The final
tally revealed that 71.6 percent of Clark County voters supported the initiative. However,
even though the bond passed comfortably, in the weeks leading up to the vote,
proponents felt that victory was anything by assured. Polls taken prior to the vote
indicated that three-quarters of southern Nevadans opposed the sales tax increase. Said
one pollster, “If I were a proponent of that tax, I’d throw in the towel.”122 Pat Mulroy
herself was not sure of the outcome either. Shortly after the measure passed she said “she
wasn’t sure until it was done how the ballot question would go…the polls were all over
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the place…we never knew where they would end up.”123
The SNWA’s massive media blitz can be partially credited for the initiative’s
passage. The Authority waged a non-stop publicity campaign that explained the need for
the expanded water infrastructure and the logic behind the sales tax measure. While the
Authority’s efforts were effective, ultimate credit must be given to Clark County voters.
Mulroy said as much when she stated that the “people looked at it logically—do you
want it in [increased] water rates, or do you want to share the pain.”124
The public’s endorsement is especially significant when one considers that
metropolitan residents were fully aware of the enormous cost of the project ($2 billion),
yet chose to fund it anyway. Assessing the events since the tax recommendation, Dick
Wimmer expressed satisfaction that the community supported the measure. He
commented on the need for the Civil Works Project and the public’s acknowledgement of
the difficulties in planning for the explosive growth in southern Nevada:
The bottom line is that the plan is flexible…no one is smart enough to predict
growth thirty years out. When you’re predicting growth a year out, you’re doing a
good job. Five years out you’re doing a good job if you’re in the ballpark. Ten,
twenty, thirty years out is guesswork…in defense of people who underestimate
our growth; they didn’t do a bad job until ten to fifteen years ago. No one
estimated this degree of expansion for this period of time.125
The CIP’s initial tasks were to improve the Valley’s intake systems at Lake Mead,
modernize the existing water treatment plant and construct an entirely new one, lay over
sixty miles of water transmission pipes, and build reservoirs and pumping stations. The
plan covered a thirty-year period, with the first three devoted to planning and design and
improving existing structures. Perhaps the most interesting piece of the CIP puzzle was
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the River Mountains Water Treatment Facility (RMWTF). Completed in 2002, it was an
engineering and architectural wonder. The facility had the capacity to treat 300 million
gallons per day, but could be expanded to 600 million in the future. It used state of the
art water treatment methods, to include ozonation, a process that infuses ozone, a gas
produced by subjecting oxygen molecules to high electrical voltage, to water. This
process has proven effective in killing various forms of contaminants including bacteria
and other organisms.126 The RMWTF is also aesthetically pleasing, with pools,
overlooks, and interpretive displays adorning its grounds. At one point the SNWA
intended for the public to see this beautiful water structure, however, the events of 9/11
caused them to reconsider. The public may still visit, but a tour guide must accompany
them.
The SNWA enjoyed great success at acquiring numerous regional water sources for
use in the LVMA; however, this success came at an enormous political, economic, and
environmental cost. Therefore, given this multi-faceted expenditure, it was absolutely
essential for the SNWA to initiate a rigorous conservation campaign in order to use these
water resources in the most efficient way possible. The Authority’s most publicized and
publicly recognized attribute, conservation’s effect on SNWA policy, cannot be
understated. By conserving water, a precious commodity in the Mojave Desert, the
SNWA demonstrated to its regional, state, and local neighbors its commitment to wise
use of water, thereby giving the organization credibility as a political entity. This
regional credibility was also vital locally. The SNWA has had to demonstrate its
commitment to conservation as an organization in order to receive the support of
southern Nevadans. The medium through which the SNWA sought to express that
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commitment was the Water Smart campaign, which offered various incentives for
consumers who agreed to conserve water.
Environmental reality will compel the SNWA to continue its conservations efforts
throughout the region well into the future; there is simply no other way the Authority will
be able to maintain its support for various growth organizations unless it continues to
aggressively push the local community to decrease water consumption. And although
Las Vegas is situated next to a pair of reliable water sources—the groundwater
underlying the metro area and the Colorado River—neither of these sources is large
enough to provide the city with enough water to guarantee an existence free from worry.
As the Valley’s population increases, so too does the potential for shortages. The SNWA
recognizes this reality and emphasized conservation since its inception in 1991. The
following section describes several methodologies the Authority employed in order to
decrease water consumption in the Las Vegas community and some of the organizations
plans for the future.
Comprised of three components—education, incentives, and regulation—the
SNWA’s conservation program met with widespread success, which saved the Valley
billions of gallons of water to date. This three-pronged conservation program was
specially designed to give the public a sense of ownership over the destiny of water
conservation. The education and incentives components have utilized positive motivation
techniques by issuing instruction on desert conservation methodologies and providing
cash incentives for citizens to remove water intensive lawns and plants from their yards,
all for the purpose of influencing residents to use less water. These two components have
been generally well received by the Las Vegas community, but the SNWA still relies on
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enforcement as a third method of decreasing consumption. The SNWA fields regulators
who patrol the Valley and can issue citations if they catch a person wasting water.
One advantage the SNWA held over its predecessors was the ability to institute a
valley-wide water policy, a comprehensive approach that greatly improved water
conservation efforts. The pace at which the SNWA initiated conservation measures began
slowly, but quickly increased during the 1990s. In the first few years of the SNWA’s
existence the organization was attempting to define a direction and to marshal its forces
in order to forge an effective conservation program.
The SNWA conservation policy follows the parameters stipulated in the SNWA
Conservation and Drought Plans. These plans work in tandem and essentially address the
same issue: namely, how to conserve water in a desert environment and differ only in
details. The Drought Plan is a tactical guide that provides guidance on the day-to-day
methodology for conservation, and the Conservation Plan is a strategic plan that
identifies the SNWA’s long-range conservation goals. Adopted in 2001, these plans
institutionalized and codified what had prior been a wide-ranging and unfocused series of
conservation measures. These plans constitute SNWA’s conservation campaign and they
too incorporate the previously mentioned themes of education, incentives, and regulation.
While there were some isolated instances of water conservations measures that
occurred during the previous decades, the move toward an institutionalized, regional
conservation plan really gained steam in 1995 when the SNWA decided to adopt and
implement the USBR’s Best Management Practices (BMPs).127 These practices were a
collection of USBR water conservation tactics and strategies that helped define the
SNWA Conservation and Drought Plans, and included such measures as turf removal
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incentives, later known as the Cash for Grass program, incentive pricing that penalizes
the heaviest users, and information and education programs.
One of the first acts under this program was a 1995 joint-sponsored xeriscape study
between the SNWA and the USBR.128 Xeriscape is a landscape style especially well
suited to arid environments since it uses far less water than traditional yards. A typical
xeriscaped yard had little grass and featured drought tolerant plant species such as cactus,
pine trees, or oleanders, and uses efficient watering techniques such as drip irrigation,
which directs a stream of water directly on the plant instead of spraying it over a larger
area. The SNWA and USBR identified outdoor water use as the single area with the
largest potential for water savings, so in 1995 the two organizations signed a cooperative
agreement to fund a study analyzing the benefits and feasibility of large-scale
xeriscaping. The initial study determined that the average family could save over 96,000
gallons a year on outdoor use by converting to a xeriscaped yard. Typical grass yards
consume around seventy-three gallons per square foot annually, compared with only 17.2
gallons for xeriscape. This represents a savings of over seventy-five percent for outdoor
use, and thirty percent for overall per capita use (a figure that includes indoor water usage
for activities like clothes/dish washing, bathing, etc.). While the study demonstrated the
savings potential, there was still the question of how to compel southern Nevadans to
remove the grass from their yards and replace it with plants that required little water. The
answer came from one of the other USBR BMPs: offer customers cash incentives to
remove their grass. The SNWA adopted this measure and it formed the basis for the
Water Smart Landscape Rebate Program (WSLRP).129
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The promising results of the SNWA xeriscape study spurred the Authority to initiate
the Water Smart Program in 1999. The SNWA designed this program to positively
motivate southern Nevadans, through cash incentives, to decrease water consumption.
During the first year of the WSLRP the SNWA offered customers forty cents for every
square foot of turf they removed. This, though, had relatively little initial impact as
consumption rates actually increased during the next few years, which prompted the
SNWA to raise the rebate amount to $1.00 per square foot in 2003, and then to $2.00 in
2006.130 These rate increases had the desired effect, as water consumption rates dropped
drastically and the SNWA settled on a $1.50 per square foot rebate in 2008. The WSLRP
has unequivocally been the SNWA’s largest success. To date it has saved the Las Vegas
community over eighteen billion gallons of water and has helped decrease regional
consumption by more than fourteen percent.
The SNWA has refined the process to make it as easier for consumers to remove the
grass from their yards. The procedure begins by checking in with the SNWA, who then
sends out a technician to do a pre-conversion site inspection. The next step is removing
the grass, often done by a professional. Many people who give up their grass attend free
landscaping classes at the Springs Preserve. In these classes local botanists and biologists
offer instruction on what plants are best suited for local environmental conditions, and
help customers create yards conducive to wildlife, such as numerous species of birds and
bats. Doug Bennett, SNWA Conservation Director notes that “It is not just about saving
water, but also about creating a more livable environment in the LVMA.”131 While
before, there was a broad expanse of monochromatic grass, following conversion there is
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a wide array of cactus and flowering plant species that greatly diversify the visual
makeup of a yard. After customers undergo conversion from grass to “water-smart”
landscaping, the SNWA then sends the individual a rebate check in the amount of $1.50
for each foot of turf removed.
While the SNWA’s turf removal program has received much public attention, there
are two additional programs of note that also contributed to decreased water consumption
rates across the Valley. The first is the Pool Cover Rebate, a program the SNWA started
in 2005. The SNWA estimated that the average family pool lost around 12,000 gallons a
year to evaporation, the bulk of which occurs during the summer months when pool
levels fall by two to three inches per day. Given that there are roughly 80,000 pools in
family homes throughout the Valley, the Pool Cover Program’s water savings potential is
quite apparent. As a result, the SNWA began targeting pool owners in their conservation
efforts by offering incentive coupons that gave customers either $50 toward, or fifty
percent off, the purchase of a plastic pool cover, and $200 toward the purchase of a
mechanical pool cover. To date the SNWA has issued approximately 12,000 rebate
coupons and paid $704,138 in incentives, which has helped save the LVMA over 452
million gallons of water.132
The second program is the Irrigation Clock Rebate. Irrigation clocks ensure that
water is used at the correct time each day and for the exact time necessary to provide a
healthy yard. It is common for customers to either water for too long, simply because
they forget how long the sprinklers have been on, or during the hotter hours of the day.
Automated clocks largely eliminate these possibilities and typically decrease the average
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family’s water consumption by ten to thirty percent, which saves over 12,000 gallons
annually per household. The SNWA agreed to rebate up to fifty percent of the cost for an
irrigation clock, but only those with the ability to sense rainfall. Although rare,
rainstorms do occur in southern Nevada and can dump more than 300,000 acre-feet of
water across the expanse of the Las Vegas Valley.133 By preventing customers from
watering their lawns during only a few of these rare rain events, the Valley can save the
equivalent of its entire annual Colorado River allotment. To date the SNWA has paid out
over $160,000 in incentives for this program, a figure that represents a savings of over
130 million gallons of water.134
The SNWA incentive programs demonstrate that money is often an effective
motivating force. The SNWA has also found that increasing the price of water also has an
effect of water usage. Water rates in southern Nevada have historically been among the
lowest in the Southwest, so in 1995 the SNWA sponsored an elasticity study to analyze
the potential effect pricing had on water consumption. Elasticity in this sense is an
economic term that refers to the amount people are willing to pay for a good. If demand
for a good remains the same regardless of price, then it is inelastic; if demand increases
or decreases based on price, the good is elastic. The SNWA study determined that some
water use was elastic and would go down following price increases. As a result, the
SNWA recommended basic water use, such as that for drinking and bathing, be modestly
priced. Uses in addition to these, however, would see an exponential increase in price.
Based on these recommendations, the member agencies implemented a tiered water
pricing structure, which had an immediate effect on consumption. The vast majority of
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money the SNWA collects through the tiered rate structure goes to fund the rebate
incentive programs mentioned previously.
The tiered pricing structure goes hand in hand with the SNWA’s public education
efforts. In an effort to give the public agency and involve common citizens in
conservation efforts, the SNWA has established partnerships with various organizations
throughout the Valley. Two of these partnerships address the public and private sector.
The first is the Water Conservation Coalition, a partnership between the SNWA and
various southern Nevada businesses that have agreed to increase water efficient business
practices, such as removing grass for the SNWA Water Smart Landscape Rebate, and
that also challenge other businesses in the Las Vegas community to do the same. Despite
the fact that businesses only account for ten percent of the total landscape removal
projects in the Valley, their conversion to water smart landscaping has accounted for
sixty percent of the total area of grass removed, clearly a huge savings in water.
The resort industry too has cooperated with the SNWA conservation efforts. Casinos
along the Las Vegas Strip, often perceived as the worst water wasters, in fact, have
labored to reduce their water use. Despite the highly visible display of fountains and
erupting volcanoes along the Las Vegas Strip, the entire resort industry only accounts for
three-percent of all water consumed in southern Nevada.135 Casinos have drastically
reduced consumption by recycling water and using a combination of turf and plant
removal. The second partnership, the H2O University, between the Authority, the Springs
Preserve, and Clark County School District, takes teachers and students from the
community and helps educate them about water conservation. Through this partnership
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the SNWA helps teachers earn professional development credits, and students receive
instruction into a whole host disciplines, including local history, geography, politics, and
economics.
The SNWA conservation campaign and Water Smart programs are the bedrock of the
Authority’s political effectiveness. The Water Smart Program has proven beneficial
regionally and locally, as well as politically, economically, and environmentally.
Regionally, the SNWA’s Water Smart program has given the Authority political capital
with other states, which has helped forge important interstate water sharing agreements.
Conservation has also given the Authority credibility for residents who have enjoyed
significant financial benefits through incentives and reduced water bills following
conversions from grass to xeriscape. Economically, conservation has meant less
infrastructural needs throughout the LVMA—fewer pumps and pipes needed for
decreased water use—and, until 2008, helped maintain the local housing market by
allowing growth to continue. Lastly, SNWA conservation efforts helped to improve the
environment by aiding in the creation of yards that support local, Mojave Desert-specific
biodiversity, something that ultimately helped keep greater amounts of water in Lake
Mead by decreasing demand in the Valley. As the twenty-first century unfolds, the
drought will continue to exert pressure on political institutions, local and regional
economies, and the environment. Therefore, the SNWA’s conservation efforts will
remain an important policy-shaping element long into the future.
The Las Vegas Wash is of vital importance to southern Nevada geologically and
politically. It is a natural channel that begins in the extreme northwestern part of the Las
Vegas Valley and runs to the southeast, passing between Frenchman’s Mountain and the
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River Mountains east of the metropolitan area, and eventually to the Colorado River. It is
the sole drainage channel for the entire Las Vegas Valley, an area consisting of 1,600
square miles. Prior to the twentieth century, water flows into the Wash were ephemeral,
that is, they ran intermittently, primarily during floods. However, as the Valley’s
population increased, this in turn brought about a corresponding increase in outflows to
the Wash, at first helping to create a large wetland and marsh. But, as growth continued,
so too did the volume of outflow, which created a canyon where the marshes once stood.
This environmental degradation had political implications since the degradation of the
wetlands allowed more sediment to reach Lake Mead. Besides Nevada, two additional
states rely on Lake Mead for their water supply and clean water is essential in
maintaining amiable interstate relationships. While the Las Vegas Wash is one of the
smallest waterways in the West, contributing only two percent of the total water inflow to
Lake Mead, its importance is inversely proportional to its size.136
Water quality has long been a concern of southern Nevadans, beginning in the early
twentieth century when local citizens protested that the local water company, a subsidiary
of the railroad, was not doing enough to protect the Las Vegas Springs and distribution
system from contamination. Further concerns arose later in the century when southern
Nevada prepared to draw Lake Mead water through the Southern Nevada Water System
in 1971. Howard Hughes wrote then Governor Paul Laxalt that he felt returning Las
Vegas’ treated wastewater to Lake Mead was unsanitary and could hurt the city’s image
as a tourist destination. Hughes’ concerns arose because the Valley’s drinking intakes
were downstream from the wash’s discharge point.137 This economic concern was echoed
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in 1998 when Patricia Mulroy asserted, “the whole economy of Southern Nevada hinges
on the Las Vegas Wash [and that] it’s an issue we can no longer take for granted.”138
Since Nevada uses return flow credits, the quality of water the SNWA returns to Lake
Mead has regional ramifications. Several downstream political governments and Indian
reservations rely on the Colorado River including California, Arizona, Mexico, and the
Mojave and Chemehuevi Indian tribes.
At one point the wetlands along the wash were merely seen as an impediment to
return flow credits, since the plants would consume some of the water. This way of
thinking began to change during the 1990s following the SNWA’s ascension. As Rick
Holmes, the SNWA environmental resources director acknowledged, “the wetlands once
were considered a place where cattails and other plants drank too much water returning to
the lake.”139 It was readily apparent that this type of thinking was becoming obsolete as
Lake Mead’s environmental quality continued to deteriorate.
Clean water helps southern Nevada in its efforts to secure more water from the
Colorado River. As a result of the drought, declining lake levels have increased the
concentration of pollutants, which in turns makes it that much more important to return
clean water to lake. As the drought continues, the potential to draw down the lake
increases. Ensuring the return of clean water to the lake not only makes sense for the
local drinking supply, but also ensures that a spirit of cooperation continues among the
Colorado River Basin states. In 1998 one SNWA official conceded that, “We—Clark
County—are considered the worst polluters among the seven Colorado River states.”140
This was clearly an image the SNWA did not want to present to its Colorado River Basin
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brethren, and the organization has worked hard to be an exemplary environmental
steward. The key to all of this was the health of the Las Vegas Wash, for it would help
ensure clean water for southern Nevada’s regional neighbors.
The significant amount of current public attention being paid to environmental issues
of the Las Vegas Wash obscures the fact that for thousands of years humans have been
drawn to the wash for its natural bounty. Early hunter/gathers undoubtedly stopped there
to collect plants and hunt game. There is actual archaeological evidence in the Wash
indicative of several Native American groups including the ancient Desert Archaic
Peoples, the Anasazi, Patayan, and Paiutes.141 It was widely believed in the scientific
community that the Las Vegas Valley was home to various bands of hunter/gatherers
until European settlement in the eighteenth century. During this period the wash
remained an intermittent stream. This began to change during the twentieth century,
however, as thousands of people began to settle in the Las Vegas Valley.
Since the Las Vegas Wash is the only drainage for the entire Valley it inevitably
became the wastewater conveyance system for the new town of Las Vegas. Growth
continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century necessitating the construction
of a new sewage treatment plant in 1957. The first, built shortly after the turn of the
twentieth century was outdated and unable to handle the increased effluent. The new
plant was located in the wash and began discharging treated effluent, which created a
continual stream of water. At this point the Las Vegas wash underwent a transformation
from desert scrub to perennial wetlands. These wetlands were without precedent in the
Las Vegas Valley and directly affected the environment. The wetlands began cleaning
and slowing the Valley’s runoff water as it flowed toward Lake Mead, and also provided
141
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an enlarged refuge for wildlife. However, they began to deteriorate during the late 1960s
as a result of increased population.142
The post-World War II era witnessed a growth explosion across the entire western
United States, especially in southern Nevada. This growth contributed to greater
outflows in the Las Vegas Wash large enough to continue supporting the wetlands.
However, in 1970 the volume of water became too much and began exerting a
devastating effect. Significant downcutting occurred along the wash, starting first near
Lake Mead, and gradually progressing up the streambed well into the Las Vegas Valley.
Downcutting is when water cuts a vertical stream bank, often the result of fast flows and
little vegetation to hold stream banks together. It is commonly seen in areas of
overgrazing where cattle strip away the natural ground cover binding the soil.
Downcutting negatively impacts the environment because it destroys the riparian zone—
level areas next to streams, areas that contain most of the vegetation needed by animal
species. It also lowers the water table, which affects well users throughout the region,
and increases sedimentation—the increase in suspended solids, usually dirt particles. As
water flows through the downcut channel it increases speed and, because there is no
vegetation to hold the ground together, picks up added dirt and debris and deposits them
downstream, in this case, into Lake Mead.
The destruction of wetlands left the Wash and Lake Mead especially vulnerable to
storms, since four inches of rainwater across the Valley equals to 350,000 acre-feet, more
than Nevada’s entire allotment from the Colorado River. These torrents course down the
wash, gouge ever-deepening channels, and deposit up to 1,600 tons of sediment into Lake
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Mead.143 In the words of former SNWA official David Donnelly, this is the same as onehundred dump truck loads of dirt.144 Furthermore, storms pick up all kinds of pollutants,
including motor oil, pesticides, bacteria, and other chemicals. By the 1990s the Wash
had long since lost its ability to filter these pollutants; its wetlands were but a memory.
Interest in the wash dates at least to the 1970s when a group of concerned citizens
created the Las Vegas Wash Development Advisory Committee to address wetland
degradation issues. For the rest of the 1970-80s there were periodic attempts to improve
the wash’s condition, but the real push came in 1997 when the Nevada Department of
Environmental Protection, in response to concerns over the health of Lake Mead, initiated
the Lake Mead Water Quality Forum.145 As an attendee of the forum, and given its
central role in southern Nevada water policy, the SNWA formed a twenty-one member
citizens committee—the Water Quality Citizens Advisory Committee—which developed
recommendations on how best to manage the wash. Following deliberation, the
Committee recommended that the SNWA coordinate the effort. The SNWA then created
the Las Vegas Wash Coordination Committee (LVWCC), an agency that produced a list
of forty-four action items that govern Wash policy. Despite the fact that the SNWA was
tasked to manage Wash restoration efforts, it is important to note that dozens of agencies
came together for the effort. Federal, state, and local governmental organizations
coordinated, along with local citizens and business owners, to contribute resources,
expertise, and time to improve the Wash’s wetlands.
In the late 1990s the health of the Wash was a particularly pressing concern.
Pollution had been increasing in Lake Mead and may have even contributed to a 1994
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outbreak of cryptosporidiosis, an illness associated with the single celled pathogen
cryptosporidium, sometimes found in water tainted with untreated effluent. This outbreak
contributed to thirty-two deaths in the LVMA among HIV patients, individuals who were
already weakened by disease. Moreover, inspectors found ammonium perchlorate, a
rocket fuel ingredient produced at the BMI complex in Henderson, leaking into the wash,
and from there into Lake Mead.146 The SNWA’s initial priority of forming a committee
to oversee the management and restoration of the wash had already been fulfilled. It was
then up to the committee to form a list of its own priorities, the first of which was the
stabilization of the wash.
The Committee correctly identified the downcut stream banks as the most important
problem to address. Their first step was to install a series of erosion control measures
that consisted of weirs and riprap. Weirs are structures underlying a stream designed to
slow water and spread it around over a wide plane, and riprap is heavy, mostly concrete
rubble deposited along or in the streambed, also to slow water, as well as to convey it in
certain directions. The riprap used in the Las Vegas Wash often came from local
demolished hotel casinos.147 Some of the oldest landmarks along the Las Vegas Strip are
now helping improve southern Nevada’s water supply.
The LVWCC’s next priority was to establish off-stream wetlands. These wetlands,
composed largely of cattails, a type of wetland plant species, naturally filtered out
contaminants by absorbing the pollutants into the plants themselves. The use of wetlands
for filtering purposes had a well-established history. During the early 1990s, Secretary of
Interior Bruce Babbitt oversaw the creation of wetlands in the Florida Everglades
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National Park to help filter out fertilizers used by nearby sugar plantations. The fertilizers
were discharging into the National Park, disrupting its natural biodiversity. The
Secretary oversaw the installation of wetlands using cattails, which formed a biological
belt between the sugar plantations and national park, a move that greatly reduced the
amount of contaminants reaching the Everglades.148
Funding for the Las Vegas Wash recovery effort came in part from the previously
mentioned SNPLMA funds, as well as from contributions from the SNWA and various
governmental agencies like the Army Corps of Engineers, National Park Service, and
Fish and Wildlife Service. Addressing a crowd of onlookers along the Las Vegas Wash,
Secretary Babbitt announced in 2000 that the government would provide $28 million to
southern Nevada for environmental protection purposes.149 Of this amount, $3.7 million
of this was directed to Clark County to purchase sensitive areas in the Wash. Both
Nevada Senators voiced their approval of the situation. Democratic Senators Harry Reid
and Richard Bryan have well-earned reputations for their commitment to environmental
issues, such as opposition to the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository, a mere
ninety miles north of Las Vegas, and other measures to protect Nevada’s public lands as
wilderness or national conservation areas. Senator Reid noted that, “The Vegas Wash and
Lake Mead are both the victims of Southern Nevada’s rapid growth…Restoring wetlands
in the area will help stop erosion and will act as a natural filter to stop harmful pollutants
from entering the lake, which supplies the Valley’s drinking water needs.” Bryan
followed this by declaring that the purchase of land near the wash could set a national

148

Bruce Babbitt, Cities in the Wilderness: A New Vision of Land Use in America (Washington: Island
Press, 2005), 13-54.
149
“Nevada Gets Money for Environment,” Las Vegas Sun, July 5, 2000.

102

example for effectively saving threatened areas due to urban expansion.150 While Bryan
left office in 2001, Reid eventually went on to become Senate Majority Leader and has
continued to support Nevada’s environmental initiatives. As by Keiba Crear, SNWA
Environmental Quality Monitoring Manager, observed, “Senator Reid’s involvement has
been very helpful for wash restoration.”151 His interest in the wash is testament to the
profound importance this little waterway has to the region.
The Las Vegas Wash, as envisioned by the LVWCC, is a network of water
purification mechanisms. The riprap and weirs mentioned before are “bio-armored,” or,
lined with natural vegetation to further enhance the barrier’s slowing effects. These
structures also serve to convey water to settling basins and slow-moving side channels,
where various types of plants absorb the pollutants suspended in the water. These
organic “water-scrubbers” consist of local bulrush, grown in the Pahranagat National
Wildlife Refuge fifty miles north of Las Vegas.152 This species of wetland vegetation is
especially well suited to purifying water, but can only do so for a specific amount of
time—they eventually reach their absorbing capacity and then have to be harvested and
replaced.
Since restoration efforts began in 1997, the wash’s condition has greatly improved, a
major accomplishment for the LVWCC and SNWA. In 2002 a Harvard University Poll
declared the wash one of five best wetlands restoration projects in the world.153 It has
since become a major recreation area for the local residents, as well as establishing itself
as a successful wildlife refuge. The wash supports a dizzying array of animal and plant
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species—everything from owls and woodpeckers, to minnows and catfish, to large
mammals like coyotes and bighorn sheep. Plant species include elm and mesquite trees,
cholla cactus, and even the endangered Las Vegas bear poppy.154
Despite this expansion of biological life, the wash faces several challenges, one of the
largest being the infiltration of invasive species. The Las Vegas Valley is home to
thousands of invasive species. Many of these have found their way to the Wash and are
crowding out the native plants and animals. Perhaps the best-known invasive species in
the American Southwest is the Tamarisk, a water intensive, extremely aggressive bush
that has taken over many riverbanks throughout the region. The LVWCC is trying to
combat this plant, but progress is slow. Tamarisk grows in very dense groups, which
makes clearing them difficult. Furthermore, their root system is quite tenacious.
Controlled burns have helped rid the Las Vegas Wash of some, but not all tamarisk.155
Funding and land procurement also continue to challenge the LVWCC and SNWA.
The Authority’s goal is to reach 176 acres of wetlands, but funding for this land is
difficult given the current economic turmoil locally and nationally. Despite the
widespread success in transforming the Las Vegas wash from environmental liability to
asset, there has been opposition to the SNWA’s efforts. Larry Paulson, retired biology
professor from UNLV sees the efforts to improve the wash as merely a ploy for the
SNWA to withdraw more water, using return flow credits, from Lake Mead.156 Paulson
commends the action taken to improve the Las Vegas Wash, but insists that increased
outflows only serve to hurt the environment and discourage conservation. Despite these
concerns, there are those who feel the wash is a perfect blending of the urban and natural
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world, another aspect of southern Nevada’s organic machine. Interior Secretary Babbitt
supported this notion in 1999 when he called the Las Vegas Wash and wetland park a
“model for Western states.”157 The Las Vegas Wash is an example of accommodating
growth, while mitigating environmental damage—a key aspect of the SNWA’s
philosophy.
All too often, critics have described Las Vegas as a place that almost deliberately
squanders resources. Yet, as this chapter clearly demonstrates, this has not been the case.
The people of the Las Vegas metropolitan area plainly displayed their community pride
when they overwhelmingly voted to support funding for the CIP. The SNWA’s
conservation efforts also seem to contradict the notion that Las Vegas is brazenly
wasteful. The partnership between residents and the SNWA has drastically reduced
individual water consumption rates for the past two decades. Water waste is becoming
increasingly less socially acceptable, as evidenced by consumer support for grass removal
programs and tiered incentive pricing. Further confounding the pundits is the presence of
the Las Vegas Wash, a 162-acre wetland located in the middle of the Las Vegas Valley, a
geographic feature that contradicts many people’s preconceived image of Las Vegas.
More important, however, are the efforts behind the “creation” of the Las Vegas Wash.
The SNWA, along with thousands of local citizens helped bring about improvements to
the Wash, further demonstrating a local commitment to environmental issues. Through it
all, collaboration has helped bring about these positive changes to the LVMA.
Teamwork between the SNWA, the Valley’s citizens, business community, and political
organizations has proven vital to success. The SNWA’s policy of working with such a

157

Angie Wagner, “Babbitt Calls Wetlands Park Proposal a Model for Western States,” Las Vegas Sun,
March 30, 1999.

105

diverse group of constituencies will undoubtedly continue to define its strategy into the
foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER 6

BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE?
In the summer of 2008 the Brookings Institute, a think tank devoted to public policy
analysis, issued a report titled Mountain Megas: America’s Newest Metropolitan Places,
and a Federal Partnership to Help Them Prosper.158 The report reviewed the challenges
facing the American Southwest in the early twenty first century and recommended
establishing partnerships between multiple levels of government to address problems on a
comprehensive, regional scale. The authors of the study stated that given the enormity of
the potential environmental and social challenges, a regional approach to solving the
Southwest’s infrastructural problems was the only effective course of action. In southern
Nevada, the Institute’s recommendation was welcome news to many planners and
politicians; however, this was not the first instance of calls for collaboration among
various political bodies. Upon its founding in 1991, the Southern Nevada Water
Authority began using a collaborative model, thus anticipating the Institute’s
recommendation by seventeen years.
The SNWA has successfully met dozens of challenges to date, in part because of its
collaborative approach to water management. This model has given the SNWA a
tactically and strategically advantageous position from which to meet future challenges,
since many of the problems southern Nevada faces in the coming century are merely
158
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larger versions of those it has already encountered: population growth, water shortages,
and drought.
Following the Second World War, southern Nevada’s urban planners predicted that
the population of Las Vegas’ metropolitan area would surpass 400,000 residents by the
turn of the twenty-first century (The actual figure turned out to be slightly over 1.8
million). Predictions such as these failed to adequately prepare subsequent city planners
for the onslaught of growth that southern Nevada experienced during the second half of
the twentieth century, a trend that continued without pause until 2008. The SNWA is
working to ensure that southern Nevada has the resources necessary to bolster the local
economy and provide water well into the distant future. While the Authority has already
its effectiveness on this front, the myriad challenges it faces require that it continue to
work with other state and federal agencies, cities and counties, and common citizens
throughout the region. What the SNWA realized in 1991, and the Brookings Institute
recommended in 2008, is that in order for people to live successfully in the American
Southwest, they need to work together and seek common ground.
An occurrence that demonstrates how thoroughly this paradigm of cooperation has
permeated the American Southwest is the Seven States Agreement (SSA) of 2007 that
defines how the Colorado River Basin States will share the Colorado River in the coming
decades. Aspects of the SSA range from protocol for using available surpluses of water
within the river system to coordinating water management efforts between the upper and
lower Colorado River basin that rely on methodologies more sensitive to environmental
conditions. The Agreement demonstrates a wide-ranging, intensive effort on the part of
seven western American states and the federal government to come together to more
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effectively manage the region’s most vital resource, the Colorado River. Collaboration in
the case of the Seven States Agreement has helped the Basin States jointly bargain for
water rather than litigate, a choice that has saved untold millions of dollars in legal fees.
As Patricia Mulroy noted in 2007, “The signing of this accord is proof this region can
work cooperatively on complex water issues and reach agreements that mutually benefit
the communities we serve…this accord provides Nevada with much additional security in
our Colorado River water supply.”159
The issues the SNWA faces in the coming years are many of those highlighted in the
Mountain Megas report: continued growth, corresponding water shortages, climate
change, and drought. While growth and water shortage are comparatively “easy” to plan
for, climate change inserts an entirely unpredictable element into the equation. Also
called global warming, climate change, as defined by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), refers to “a change of climate which is
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods.”160 While these issues present daunting challenges, the SNWA
is confident that it can meet them by staying focused on its collaborative methodology.
Notes Dick Wimmer, SNWA Deputy General Manager, it “all comes back foundation of
SNWA….Teamwork.”161
Throughout most of its history, the SNWA has primarily focused on establishing
local and regional partnerships. Beginning in 2007, however, the Authority
geographically expanded its focus significantly when it and seven of the nation’s largest
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water providers established a partnership to provide leadership and collaboration on
climate change issues. The coalition, labeled the WUCA (Water Utility Climate
Alliance) is comprised of Denver Water, Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, New York City Department of Environmental protection, Portland Water
Bureau, San Diego County Water Authority, The San Francisco Public Utilities
Commission, Seattle Public Utilities and the SNWA. These organizations provide
drinking water to more than thirty-six million people throughout the United States.162
Southern Nevada and the SNWA have a real interest in the effects of climate change
given the region’s extreme temperature fluctuations. The WUCA, along with the SNWA
issued the following recommendations with regard to climate change mitigation efforts:
reduce the uncertainty of scientific projections, enhance the collection, maintain and
enhance the accessibility of information, improve access to consistent climate data, and
coordinate international research efforts.163 Patricia Mulroy described the import of the
alliance when she stated
[w]ater agencies throughout the nation will invest hundreds of billions of
dollars in infrastructure over the next fifteen years alone, and those
investments must be informed by climate projections that are as accurate
as possible…Open, ongoing dialogue and active cooperation must be at
the center of our efforts to confront the possible burdens presented by
climate change. Voices from research and scientific communities, the
public, government and environmental organizations all should be
heard.164
The SNWA has continuously sought to meet environmental challenges on a regional,
rather than a local level. The organization cites several reasons for this strategy, perhaps
the most prominent revolves around equity. The SNWA has fully absorbed the value or
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mutual back scratching and asserts that challenges rarely affect only one or two entities,
but rather all the parties concerned. Mulroy points out that “if you…try to off-load your
share of a shortage onto someone else the burden becomes impossible for those taking the
double hit.”165 In the case of water in the American Southwest, every state, county, and
city will be affected in times of drought. This makes it impossible, not to mention
immoral, to compel a minority of communities to shoulder the entire burden of regional
water shortage. A collective approach helps everyone through times of hardship, and the
establishment of WUCA represents an expansion of this collaborative model to a national
level, one that unites southern Nevada with cities across the country in an effort to reduce
the potential impacts of climate change. To effectively combat climate change the
SNWA recognizes that it must focus on proper resource management and that to be
successful it must address several challenges in southern Nevada.
The SNWA has been an active participant in partnerships that have led to more
effective and efficient resource management. A major development in this regard is the
management of Lake Powell and Lake Mead as a singular unit, rather than separate
entities. Under the previously mentioned SSA Congress granted the Bureau of
Reclamation a higher degree of flexibility in releasing water from Lake Powell to Lake
Mead. The Colorado River Basin states agreed that environmental factors can and should
be taken into account when administering the Colorado River. Prior to the Seven States
Agreement, in accordance with the Law of the River, the USBR was required to release
8.23 million acre-feet annually to the lower basin regardless of environmental conditions.
Under the SSA the Bureau of Reclamation can release or withhold water if it is
environmentally beneficial to do so. While the Seven States Agreement helps illustrate
165
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the SNWA’s willingness to help manage natural sources of water, the Authority is also
seeking artificial means of providing additional water through a technology known as
desalination, to southern Nevada.
Desalination, or the process of removing salt from water, is currently seen as a
panacea for ending much of the world’s drinking water shortage. Current desalination
technology consists primarily of two methods. The first is called reverse osmosis and is a
process that forces salty or brackish water through a membrane that removes impurities.
The second method is called fractional distillation, which is a process of boiling water to
create steam. The steam rises, leaving impurities behind and is collected to become a
source of high quality drinking water. Although expensive, desalination became
increasingly viable at the beginning of the twenty first century as much of the world’s
fresh water drinking supply dwindled and was already in large-scale use in parts of the
Middle East, Africa, and Australia.
In the American Southwest desalination has become a potential source for water
given the technological breakthroughs and the added pressure of the region’s increased
population. Many people within the Colorado River Basin have called for the serious
consideration of desalination as a way to augment water supplies. In anticipation of this
eventuality, the Bureau of Reclamation in 2007 reopened a desalination plant in Yuma,
Arizona, which had lain dormant for several decades, in order to conduct tests.166 The
plant, originally constructed to purify water entering Mexico, is capable of purifying
eighty million gallons of water a day. The reopening of the Yuma plant indicates the
growing momentum toward desalination.
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In spite of desalination’s promising potential, it still does not solve southern Nevada’s
water needs. If the SNWA should partner with other states for desalination efforts, any
water southern Nevada receives would be in the form of exchanges for an increased share
of the Colorado River and not from any water piped from desalination plants. The
arrangement would most likely take the form of California, Arizona, or Mexico building
a desalination plant with SNWA funds on the Pacific coast. Several coastal communities
could then draw upon a reserve of desalinated ocean water, which would subsequently
allow the SNWA to withdraw a corresponding amount from Lake Mead. Mulroy
explains, "I mean, if we had coastal property, we would be building our own desalter. But
we don't have coastal property. So the only way we can do it is by building facilities in
other areas, and by using the river as an exchange tool."167 While there is much potential
in this plan, it is not the cure-all for southern Nevada’s water needs. These plants create
water for coastal communities, but the prohibitive costs of pumping water to Nevada will
force Las Vegas’ continued reliance upon Lake Mead. This fact has compelled the
SNWA to proceed with the northern Nevada pipeline project mentioned in chapter three.
The threat of climate change and drought along the Colorado River requires the
SNWA to continue diversifying southern Nevada’s water supplies. Since responsible
water planning cannot rely upon one source alone, the SNWA has proceeded with its plan
to tap subterranean water in White Pine and Lincoln counties. According to the SNWA
the “project would utilize unused, naturally replenished, available water” and would not
overdraw the aquifers, an action that could negatively impact the area’s ranching
community. Despite the controversial nature of the plan, the Authority has managed
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attract some significant allies in its effort to build the pipeline. It has partnered with
several organizations including the Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Park Service,
Bureau of Land Management, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and many
members of northeastern Nevada’s ranching community. The SNWA expects that the
pipeline will be finished sometime in 2015, with deliveries to come shortly thereafter.
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the SNWA pipeline plan is that it is going to
have an adverse effect on northeastern Nevada’s ecology. While the SNWA is
determined to secure a reliable supply of high-quality drinking water for southern
Nevada, the organization points to several examples it hopes will dispel concerns. The
SNWA is quick to point out that it has conducted numerous environmental impact studies
throughout the northern counties and that it has purchased ranches in order to free up
water and preserve cultural sites. On the other hand, critics could point out that it was the
SNWA that funded these environmental studies, and that it is only purchasing ranches so
as to minimize local opposition. While the controversy will undoubtedly continue well
into the future, the SNWA is working to position itself in the public consciousness as an
environmental steward and trying to set a positive example for the southern Nevada
community.
In an effort to reduce its carbon footprint and become more environmentally
sustainable, the SNWA is evaluating the potential for wind, solar, and geothermal energy
to fuel various infrastructural needs. The SNWA voluntarily committed to meet twenty
percent of its energy needs through renewable resources by the year 2015. The SNWA
has also implemented several hydroelectric generators throughout the Las Vegas Valley.
All of the water withdrawn from Lake Mead has to eventually be returned to the lake.
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Following its use by the Valley’s residents this water is used to generate electricity. As
the water flows downhill it passes through a series of hydro-generators that create power.
This allows the SNWA to recoup some of the energy that it expended to originally pump
that water out of Lake Mead and into the southern Nevada community. The SNWA also
receives a significant amount of energy through the use of solar power generators located
on various sites throughout the Valley. This too helps power the pumps that deliver
water from Lake Mead.
The SNWA’s has worked to establish a public image as a community leader, one that
leads by example. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this came with the
construction of the Molasky building, completed in 2008. The building is located in
downtown Las Vegas on what was formerly a rail yard for the Union Pacific Railroad.
Part of the downtown redevelopment effort, the building provides office-space for several
large firms and is the SNWA headquarters. It is filled with numerous environmentally
sustainable innovations including underfloor air distribution system (a design feature that
decreases the amount of piping needed and improves air circulation), recycled wall
insulation, water recycling system, low flow plumbing, a recycling center, and a
partnership with 24 Hour Fitness, which shares the building with the SNWA, to allow
employees access to showers, thus helping promote bicycle commuting.168 The SNWA’s
deputy director Dick Wimmer summarized the Molasky building’s mission when he said
“it is vital that we continue efforts on every front to reduce our carbon footprint and live
sustainably in our desert environment. The Molasky Corporate Center is a testament to
corporate sustainability.”169 The SNWA’s construction of environmentally sustainable
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buildings and infrastructure is the organization’s attempt to instill a conservation ethos
that will help ensure the long-term viability of the southern Nevada economy and
environment.
While the SNWA is making progress in constructing environmentally sustainable
infrastructure, there looms an additional challenge to the environmental health of the Las
Vegas Valley, and it takes the form of invasive species. Invasive species pose a
considerable threat to southern Nevada’s ecological health, as well as to the entire
American West. The SNWA recognized the significant threat of invasive species and in
the 1990s partnered with other local, state, and federal agencies to seek ways of
increasing native biodiversity and reducing the negative effects of introduced plants and
animals. Perhaps the most prolific of all invasives in the West is a plant known
alternately as the saltcedar or the tamarisk bush. This plant is especially destructive for
Las Vegas since it consumes tons of water from the Colorado River through
evopotranspiration. The tamarisk is found locally in the Las Vegas Wash, but its range
extends throughout the Colorado River Basin. Many communities are experimenting
with various methods to eradicate the plant, with mixed success. Burning and biological
warfare through the use of beetles that feed off the plant’s bark have proven the most
successful means to date. 170 In the upper Colorado River Basin the tamarisk bark beetle
has successfully reduced the number of plants along various river shores. The beetle is
not evolved to deal with the higher temperatures along the lower Colorado River
however, and it has not yet been employed in the Las Vegas Valley. Despite the beetle’s
promise in the Upper Basin, the range of the tamarisk is vast and much more intensive
and comprehensive efforts will be needed in order to eradicate the bush. The SNWA
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continues to study this possibility, as well as rates of evopotranspiration, in an effort to
mitigate the tamarisk’s effects in southern Nevada.
Plants are not the only species to have an adverse effect on southern Nevada’s water
supply. The quagga mussel, a type of bivalve similar to the barnacles found on sea going
vessels was discovered in Lake Mead in January 2007.171 The mussel, a transplant from
the Great Lakes, is enormously destructive to the Southwestern environment in a number
of ways. First, it out-competes the native fish populations by consuming the food supply.
The mussel can also reproduce at alarming rates, thus rapidly expanding and displacing
local aquatic species. The quagga mussel also damages water infrastructure by clogging
pipes and intake valves, and has cost southwestern water agencies millions of dollars to
date in upkeep. The SNWA met the quagga mussel challenge by establishing a
monitoring program to examine the specie’s effect on biodiversity and infrastructure.
Furthermore, the SNWA’s water treatment regimen destroys all mussels before they
reach the drinking water system. The SNWA is working with other water management
agencies across the West to coordinate prevention programs, helping establish protocols
for the cleaning of boats and education programs to increase public awareness regarding
the matter.
While the threat of invasive species is significant, the SNWA is also concerned about
the overall health of southern Nevada’s waterways and has implemented a number of
additional measures to protect them. In 2007 the SNWA began funding seven biological
research projects examining the various aspects of the Virgin River ecosystem. The
studies include invasive plant species water consumption rates, riparian area studies,
assessments examining the endangered southwestern willow fly catcher, Virgin River
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chub and woundfin, small mammal studies such as bat monitoring, and vegetation and
plant studies.172 The SNWA is also working to ensure the health of the Warm Springs
Natural Area, which is a collection of springs that form the headwaters of the Muddy
River. The SNWA acquired the area to protect the endangered Moapa dace (a type of
fish), restore and manage the area as an ecological preserve, create opportunities for low
impact recreation, develop public environmental education opportunities, provide a
national scientific research program on aquatic and terrestrial systems, and to serve as a
water bank for future water delivery systems. To more effectively manage the area, the
SNWA partnered with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Nature
Conservancy, Nevada Department of Wildlife, and the other Colorado River Basin States.
While these initiatives all speak to a growing environmental consciousness, they are
also born of necessity and work to help naturally purify Southern Nevada’s drinking
water. The SNWA’s work to improve the health of the various regional river systems has
done a great deal to improve the quality of Las Vegas’ drinking water supply. The
SNWA continues to place heavy emphasis on its water quality lab located at the River
Mountain water treatment facility. This lab houses an entire research division, which is
constantly seeking improved methods for ensuring the removal of biological and
chemical contaminants from southern Nevada’s water supply. However, the SNWA
must still further purify the water it withdraws from Lake Mead; the SNWA continually
seeks more efficient and effective means of doing so. To this end, the SNWA is going
forward with construction of a third intake valve into Lake Mead that will reach farther
from the shore and to a greater depth. This intake will guarantee Las Vegas has access to
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water should lake levels drop to the point that intake number one, the first and oldest
water intake valve, should become inoperable.
Perhaps the most visible example of the SNWA’s conservation education efforts
came in 2008 when the Authority, in partnership with the EPA, hosted the Water Smart
Innovation Conference, an event attended by over 1,200 participants from 177 foreign
nations.173 Memorable speakers included Prince Fiesal Ibn Al-Hussein of Jordan.
Jordan’s representation at the conference helps illustrate the SNWA’s leading role in
conservation efforts since Jordan is one of the most water starved countries on the planet
and is simultaneously experiencing rapid population growth. Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid of Nevada also lent his considerable stature to the conference by speaking at
length on the need to conserve and protect the desert Southwest’s vital water resources.
The SNWA will continue to use highly public events such as the Water Smart
Innovations Conference to educate the regional public about conservation issues in the
Southwest, but will also focus locally through its educational outreach programs.
The SNWA has long recognized that its success hinges upon successful collaboration
with the broader community, and set about creating education programs that informed the
public about a broad array of environmental conservation methods. The SNWA’s main
initiative in education is to instill within the public a philosophy that recognizes the need
for sustainability; the public has responded positively to the SNWA’s leadership in these
issues and willingly decreased its water usage dramatically. In 2007, pleased with
developments in the LVMA, Patricia Mulroy stated that “[o]ur community is becoming
more aware of its environmental footprint and water is central to sustainability.”174
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The key element of the SNWA’s success has been its policy of collaboration. This
policy of working with, instead of against, various water users has contributed to the
success of infrastructural improvements, environmental initiatives, regional and interstate agreements, and water acquisition efforts. The SNWA began as an inward looking
organization focused almost solely on the LVMA’s water needs. While this component
of the Authority’s mission remains, the agency has become a major political power in the
American Southwest. The SNWA now takes a leadership role in regional water politics
and its collaborative framework is now a model for other water agencies throughout the
West.
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CHAPTER 7

LEARNING FROM THE ANASAZI: LAS VEGAS AND THE RISE OF AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHOS
The American West has always been a dynamic and changing place, a fact that is
especially true for the Las Vegas Valley. The region has been home to dozens of ethnic
groups, from paleo-Indians, to ranchers and Mormons. It has been the site of an ancient
civilization, one based on agriculture and whose culture created brilliant works of
architecture and art. This culture, known to us as the Anasazi, offers modern day Las
Vegas a two-part lesson: it demonstrates how quickly economies and the environment
can change, and how humans can negatively impact their environment. For several
centuries the Anasazi experimented with different types of economies, gradually moving
from hunter-gatherers to permanent settlements based on agriculture. Their villages and
culture flourished, giving rise to multi-story buildings, road networks, and a regional
proliferation of art and pottery. Their kivas—places of worship and gathering—were dug
into the ground and richly adorned with bird feathers and murals. Their petroglyphs can
still be seen throughout the region and represent a beautiful and skillful display of art;
however, underlying this beauty are indicators of how their civilization collapsed.
The Anasazi culture was a study in overconfidence, building a precarious existence
upon a vulnerable environmental region. They deforested vast areas of their homeland in
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order to build grand pueblos and kivas.175 Irrigation was over used and salinized the
ground, thus rendering it useless from an agricultural standpoint.176 Anasazi use of these
environmental practices placed their society in a precarious position, and when the
climate changed during the fourteenth century it had dire consequences for most of their
settlements in the desert Southwest. Their example provides a valuable lesson for
modern society on desert living.
Today, a similar pattern of human settlement has emerged in the American
Southwest. Like the Anasazi, modern-day southern Nevadans have experimented with
several types of economies, beginning with Mormon agriculture, then transportation
(railroad), followed by defense and public works, and finally gaming. While gaming is
still proving a generally effective economic choice, the collapse of Anasazi culture
throughout the Southwest exposes the potential dangers in the Las Vegas area’s primary
reliance upon a single-industry in an environmentally severe region.
Returning to the theme of de-exceptionalization, the Anasazi example demonstrates a
significantly longer span of human habitation in southern Nevada, a fact that runs counter
to the public perception of Las Vegas as an instant city and one without a pre-twentieth
century history. It also helps us understand Las Vegas in a broader, older, and more
typical American western context. Nevertheless, sensational stories persist. Authors
frequently examine exceptional aspects of southern Nevada’s history, to include the
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community’s imminent environmental demise, tales of mob violence, or the hedonism for
which the town is known. This, however, is the wrong kind of exceptionalism, for the
truly exceptional development in southern Nevada has been the methodical and
consistent development of a regional conservation ethos in a metropolitan area that
thrives on its image of excess. While many people find tales of the LVMA’s precarious
relationship with the environment and mob violence entertaining, these phenomena are
not unique to Las Vegas. Many cities throughout the country, and the world for that
matter, are situated in unforgiving regions, and the presence of the mob can be found in
dozens of cities stretching from the West Coast of the United States all the way to Italy.
What is unique to the LVMA is a situation in which several communities agreed to come
together to share water rather than to fight over it.
When the LVMA’s water providers gathered in 1991 to create the SNWA, they
established a flexible system well suited to address future challenges. They recognized
the importance of putting an end to conflict—that the entire community would suffer if
they could not come to a solution for amenably distributing water.
The SNWA brought a new approach to water management in southern Nevada, one
that dynamically integrated people, economics, and resources. It allowed for a drastic
increase in conservation, cutting water consumption throughout the region, as well as
helping to increase the resources available to the growing metropolis. The SNWA helped
Nevada present a united front to its regional neighbors and the federal government, which
has helped immensely in acquiring water from the Colorado River for the Las Vegas
community. Moreover, the SNWA’s success has inspired numerous agencies to come to
southern Nevada, from as far away as Australia, in order to learn the reasons for the

123

Authority’s success.177 Some cities, like Reno, Nevada, have even sought guidance in
how to create a similarly structured organization.178 The Colorado River Basin states
have begun to work more closely with one another in part, as a result of the SNWA’s
leadership. With the increased severity of climate change, collaboration is the only way
the region’s population will be able to thrive. Climate change, coupled with the region’s
reliance on a diminishing Colorado River, mandates teamwork, examples of which are
already evident in the California and Arizona Water Banking Agreements between those
states and Nevada. However, to date most teamwork has occurred between states within
the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins. In the future, planning will need to take an
even higher degree of integration in which both basins work in concert. Progress has
already been made on this front—witness the 2007 Seven States Agreement. A vital part
of that agreement outlines how Lakes Mead and Powell will be managed as an integrated
unit, rather than as coveted prizes, jealously guarded by the Upper and Lower Basin
states.
The region’s dryness caused the early city leaders to realize the need for unity. And
while many feared the creation of the SNWA in 1991—worrying aloud that it would be
highly centralized, unresponsive to the public, and vested with too much power—few
now can envision ever going back. The regional focus and drive to include others in an
integrated system gives the SNWA and the larger Southwest the power and ability to
survive in a harsh desert environment. A decent appreciation of history—coupled with
local and regional partnerships—has prepared the SNWA to continue providing water for
Southern Nevada. The SNWA has become an integral part of the LVMA’s community,
177

Doug Bennett email message to author July 2008, author’s files.
Truckee Meadows Water Authority Minutes, February 3, 2006, Meeting of Board of Directors,
www.tmh2o.com/about_us/board/pdfs/Minutes20060203.pdf, accessed April 22, 2009.
178

124

establishing it as a major fixture in Southern Nevada for as long as the region is in need
of humanity’s most vital resource—water.
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